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Contact: Ireneusz Kondak  
Tel: 03.90.21.59.86

Date: 01/04/2025

**DH-DD(2025)377**

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Meeting: 1531<sup>st</sup> meeting (June 2025) (DH)

Item reference: Action Plan (31/03/2025)

Communication from Türkiye concerning the case of Yuksel Yalcinkaya v. Türkiye (Application No. 15669/20) - *The appendices in Turkish are available upon request to the Secretariat.*

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Réunion : 1531<sup>e</sup> réunion (juin 2025) (DH)

Référence du point : Plan d'action (31/03/2025)

Communication de la Türkiye concernant l'affaire Yuksel Yalcinkaya c. Türkiye (requête n° 15669/20) **(anglais uniquement)** - *Les annexes en turc sont disponibles sur demande au Secrétariat.*

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## REVISED ACTION PLAN

*Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye (15669/20)*

**Judgment of and Final on 26 September 2023**

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### I. CASE DESCRIPTION

1. The European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) found a violation of the principle of no punishment without law. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that the domestic courts had not established the offence’s constituent material and mental elements in an individualised manner in convicting the applicant for membership of an armed terrorist organisation by relying decisively on the use of an encrypted messaging application named “ByLock” (Article 7).
2. The Court also found a violation of the right to a fair trial on the grounds that the applicant’s defence submissions relating to the data obtained from the encrypted messaging application server had not been sufficiently taken into account and that no answer to the applicant’s requests concerning his defence had been provided (Article 6 § 1).
3. The Court further found a violation of the right to freedom of assembly and association on account of the domestic courts’ unforeseeable extension of the scope of offence when relying on the applicant’s membership of a trade union and an association considered as affiliated with a terror organisation, to corroborate his conviction (Article 11).

### II. INDIVIDUAL MEASURES

#### **Just Satisfaction**

4. Considering that there was no causal link between the violations and the pecuniary damage complained of, the Court dismissed the applicant’s claims for pecuniary damage.
5. The Court also rejected the applicant’s claims for non-pecuniary damage, considering that a finding of a violation could be regarded as sufficient just satisfaction.
6. In respect of costs and expenses, the Court awarded the applicant EUR 15,000. This sum was paid to the applicant within the deadline set by the Court. The information on the payment was published on HUDOC-EXEC.

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### **Reopening of the Proceedings**

7. The authorities would like to point out that Article 311 § 1 (f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271) gives the applicant the opportunity to request the reopening of the criminal proceedings (i.e. retrial) within one year of the Court's final judgment finding a violation.
8. The applicant availed himself of this remedy and submitted a request for the reopening of the proceedings.
9. As a result of the retrial, on 12 September 2024 the Kayseri 2<sup>nd</sup> Assize Court ("Assize Court" of "Trial Court") decided to uphold his previous conviction (6 years and 3 months' imprisonment) for the offence of "being a member of the terrorist organisation" with the possibility to lodge an appeal on points of facts and law under Article 323 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271) (see Annex 1).
10. First of all, the Government would like to emphasise that the Assize Court conducted a completely new trial, gathering all the evidence and carrying out its own examination. The authorities would like to draw attention to the new pieces of evidence which the Assize Court collected in the course of the retrial and the manner in which the evidence was assessed in general terms.
11. Within the scope of the retrial, the Assize Court assessed the Court's judgment finding a violation and took into account the points it underlined as grounds for the violation. In this regard, it made significant determinations about the ByLock findings and evaluation report in respect of the applicant, which was added to the case file after the first judgment:

*"The expert report dated 29 June 2017 regarding the examination on the relevant report and digital findings (CGNAT, HIS records and digital findings as to the ByLock programme) indicates that the accused person logged into the 46(...) ByLock programme target port for 443 times between 3 October 2015 and 23 October 2015 (...) through a telephone with the IMEI number 3536(...) and the GSM line with number 537(...) which he admitted to using, and that he connected to the ByLock servers. [In addition], the report on ByLock CPPO query results, dated 2 April 2024, indicates that having regard to the fact that any WIFI connection might enable the connection, on 3 October 2015 he connected [to the programme] for the first time and according to the*

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*ByLock findings and evaluation report, his last connection was made on 31 January 2016. It has been found ... that these issues were definitely verified via the CGNAT and HIS records belonging to the mobile phone (537...) which was found established that it was used by the applicant."*

12. The Assize Court made a detailed examination on the ByLock findings and evaluation report in respect of the applicant and a thorough analysis on the ByLock messages. In this context, the Assize Court made the following assessments:

*"As a result of the examination on the ByLock findings and evaluation report, it has been understood that the accused person used the account with the User ID no. [408783] in ByLock, that his user-name was [yuxel] and password was [yks!8341], and that his last access was on 31 January 2016. Upon the examination of the findings and evaluation report included in the case-file, it has been seen that the accused person created his user-name and password in combinations of his own name and that in this regard, the accused person complied with the criteria of creating user-names and passwords according to the instructions, as observed in the previous proceedings. The relevant report revealed a self-introducing message sent by the accused person on 20 June 2015, with the content "hello, it's yüksel yalçinkaya." Furthermore, the e-mail dated 25 December 2015 included the following expressions **"...a gentleman came to the dormitory with his wife, and there was TRY 96,000 in the envelope... He said, 'Spend the money for your service...' and "Those who do not refrain from writing unimaginable scenarios about Fethullah Gülen..."** ( ...bir beyefendi hanımıyla yurda geldiler zarfın içinde 96.000 TL para vardı ... Bu parayı hizmetinizde harcayın dedi...", "Fethullah Gülen hakkında akla hayale gelmeyecek senaryolar yazmaktan geri durmayanlar...). The following ByLock e-mail content was found as a result of the examination on the finding and evaluation report regarding the accused person's ByLock account **"...to those who have lost their sense of mercy... it won't take long for the community to realise that they saved the country from the edge today... They arrived on 3 November at 17:25, almost the same point on the clock, (will) they leave near November..."** and **"...the day when those who cause pain will feel pain as well... they increase their oppressions more and more..."** ( ...karşıda merhamet duygusunu kaybetmişlere... cemaatin bugün ülkeyi uçurumdan aldığını anlaması sürmeyecek ... 3 kasımda geldiler 17:25 neredeyse saat üzerinde aynı noktadır, kasıma ramak kala gidecekler(mi)..." ve devamla **"...can yakanların canlarının yanacağı gün ... zulümlerini artırdıkça artırıyorlar)**. (...) they were organisational messages aimed at connecting*

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*and boosting the morale of the organisation members, portraying the organisation's leader as a saviour, and targeting the legal investigations and prosecutions against the organisation with revengeful statements like "the day when they will feel pain as well" (onların da canı yanacağı gün).*

13. Having regard to the findings and evaluation report, the Assize Court, subsequently, conducted a detailed analysis on the contact list available in the ByLock application on the applicant's mobile phone. In this regard, the Assize Court found that he had added six persons on ByLock. It thereupon requested their case-files and made an examination on their statements. It decided to hear K.Ş. as witness whose statements it deemed to be important. The Assize Court also made a witness search, and heard T.A. who had informed against the applicant by calling the crime-report line at the beginning of the investigation and A.V. who worked as a teacher at the same school with the applicant. The relevant part of the Assize Court's judgment reads as follows:

*"It has been found that the accused person with the ID no. 408783 added to his ByLock contact list E.İ. with the ID no. 199156, Z. E. with the ID no. 339490, S.Y. with the ID no. 342940, K.Ş. with the ID no. 381906, R.Ş. with the ID no. 395157 and S.G. with the ID no. 437478, and that he had contact with them via ByLock.*

*It has been seen that E.İ. was on trial under the case-file with no. (...) and sentenced to 6 years and 3 months' imprisonment; Z.E. was on trial under the case-file no. (...) and sentenced to 6 years and 3 months' imprisonment; S.Y. was on trial under the case-file with no. (...) and sentenced to 6 years and 3 months' imprisonment; R.S. was on trial under the case-file with no. (...) and sentenced to 6 years and 3 months' imprisonment; and S.G. was on trial under the case-file with no. (...) and sentenced to 6 years and 3 months' imprisonment. In its assessment whether those persons should be heard as witnesses, our court has found that they, except for K.Ş., did not give statements or make defence submissions within the scope of effective remorse in the course of the proceedings against them and they denied the charges aimed at exonerating themselves from the offence. It has been understood that their statements as witnesses would not contribute to the trial before our court, that K.Ş. wished to benefit from the provisions on effective remorse at the judicial process before the regional court of appeal and that in his statements taken by our court, he declared that he did not know the accused person.*

*On (...) K.Ş. who gave his testimony within the scope of the case-file no. E. (...) and K. (...) before the 4<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Appeal stated*

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*that “he took part within the FETÖ/PDY Armed Terrorist Organisation that asked him to download the ByLock programme from Google Play, he did so and started to use this programme, and anyone attending conversation meetings (sohbet) downloaded it on their phones. Although K.Ş. declared that he did not know Yüksel Yalçınkaya in his statements taken as a witness by our court, it has been found that he was on the ByLock contact list of the accused Yüksel Yalçınkaya.*

*The witness A.V. stated in his testimony heard in the presence of his lawyer within the scope of the file no. (...) before the Sivas Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office that “We started to attend conversation meetings affiliated with FETÖ/PDY with other teachers at the school in 1999. Their names are S.Y., Z.E. and Yüksel Yalçınkaya”. A.V. also identified the accused person.”*

14. The Assize Court made a detailed examination on the applicant’s request that the ByLock raw data be given to him and sent a writ to the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office. The Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office noted in its reply that it was not technically possible to sift the raw data on User ID basis without subjecting it to any procedure since it was not readable, and that providing the whole raw data to any suspect/accused person was not possible as it would contain information concerning other suspects/accused persons. In this context, the Assize Court made the following assessments:

*“The defendant party failed to file any substantial objection against the reply to the writ of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office or to allege that the reasons in the reply were not reasonable, just or in the public interest, but he only reiterated his request for the delivery of raw data.*

*Having regard to the facts that (i) the ByLock raw data is of an integrated nature in respect of all the investigations and prosecutions concerning the membership to the FETÖ/PDY Armed Terrorist Organisation, (ii) the examinations and assessments on the data is still ongoing, and (iii) **there is a risk against the integrity of the data if the access is made available for the defendant party’s examination within the scope of any file, the decision rejecting the said request is in line with the law and the procedure. Furthermore, while the defendant party requested digital data regarding the ByLock findings, it has not specifically been demonstrated what result is sought from these data and what matter is to be proven.***

*Again, in addition to the ByLock findings, although the HIS and CGNAT records and IP identifications, which confirmed these findings, were open to the*

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*access of the defendant party and discussed at the hearing following the expert examination, the defendant party did not raise any substantial objection to these data - or to the expert report in which these data were evaluated.”*

15. In its judgment rendered at the end of the retrial, the Assize Court made the following assessment as to the possibility that the applicant may have downloaded the ByLock application by mistake:

*“Article 30 § 1 of the Law no. 5237 provides that ‘A person who, at the time of committing an act, is unaware of the material elements of the offence as defined by law shall not be considered to have acted intentionally. The liability for negligence due to such mistake shall be reserved.’ According to this legislation, in respect of the offence of membership to an armed terrorist organisation, which could only be committed intentionally (with direct intent), unawareness of the organisation’s nature negates ‘intent’.*

*[...]*

*When an assessment is made in respect of the case-file within the framework of the relevant legislations and judicial decisions, it is evident that the accused person continued to exchange e-mails of which organisational nature is indisputable (including those sent to keep members connected and those targeting individuals involved in investigations against the organisation, revealing an intent of revenge) even after the public became fully aware of the true nature and ultimate purposes of the FETÖ/PDY Armed Terrorist Organisation during the process of 17/25 December 2013 which were officially declared and acknowledged by the National Security Council on 30 October 2014. Among these correspondences, an e-mail dated 3 January 2016 sent by the user with ID no. 199156 to the accused person (408783 ID) explicitly conveys tactics developed by the organisation to disrupt investigations and methods for destroying evidence, and urges the accused person to display sensitivity. Another e-mail dated 3 February 2016 sent by the user with ID no. 339490 to the accused person (408783 ID) requests information on the number of organisational activities and participants. Having regard to these issues, it has been concluded that the non-material (direct intent) element of the imputed offence was constituted. Because, these events occurred at a time when the entire country was aware of the true objectives of the FETÖ/PDY Armed Terrorist Organisation. This fact indicates that the accused person continued to remain within the hierarchy of the organisation, participated in its secret communication*

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*network, and followed organisational instructions even after its ultimate purposes and activities constituting an offence had been publicly exposed.*

*Moreover, since the accused person presented no defence submission claiming that “he made a mistake” regarding the nature of the organisation, the provisions governing mistake (error) were considered but were not applied due to the absence of the necessary legal conditions.*

*Under Article 30 of the Turkish Criminal Code (“TCC”), mistake is a factor that removes or reduces culpability and refers to a discrepancy between the intended and actual outcome of an act.*

*[...]*

*Considering all the evidence available in the case file (including the evidence later obtained and discussed during the trial, in addition to those cited in our court’s initial decision), an unforeseeable and expansive interpretation has not been made as to the elements of the offence defined under Article 314 § 2 of the TCC against the accused person in determining the non-material elements of the offence imputed on him. Therefore, the manner in which our court has applied the norms regarding the criminal law does not constitute a violation of the guarantees under Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).”*

16. Within the scope of retrial, the Assize Court made a detailed examination on the applicant’s account transactions in Bank Asya and having obtained an expert report in this regard, it emphasised the following issues:

*“At that point, another aspect that must be evaluated in the trial concerning the offence of membership to the FETÖ/PDY Armed Terrorist Organisation is the accused person’s account transactions in Bank Asya. As appeared in the media on 15 January 2014, the leader of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation instructed its members and supporters to deposit money into Bank Asya as a show of support and he even urged them to sell all their assets if necessary and deposit this amount into the bank. Following this instruction, it was observed that the organisation’s members and supporters complied with this call made by the leader of the organisation by depositing money into Bank Asya on 15 January 2014 and in the period thereafter, in an effort to support the armed terrorist organisation.*

*Subsequently, it has been understood that on 4 September 2014 the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board (“BDDK”) placed the bank under the scope of Article 70, which contains restrictive measures and that after this development, the*



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*frequency of transactions of depositing money made by the members and supporters of the armed terrorist organisation to support the Bank significantly increased. Following the full seizure of the Bank by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (“TMSF”) on 30 May 2015, many account holders began withdrawing their funds in an apparent effort to create the perception that “TMSF is bankrupting the Bank.”, and acted simultaneously in an organised effort, contrary to the normal flow of life. It has been found that these actions were carried out in accordance with the organisational orders and instructions.*

*Upon reviewing the expert report dated 12 January 2024 which was included in the case file, it has been found that (i) the accused person deposited TRY 3,000.00 into his bank account on 5 February 2014, and purchased gold; (ii) this transaction was made shortly after the organisation leader’s call for financial support; (iii) in May 2015, the accused person’s account balance decreased due to withdrawals; and (iv) the timing of these withdrawals coincided with the period when the members of the organisation were withdrawing their funds to create the perception that the Bank became insolvent. Thus, it is evident that the accused person deposited money into his Bank Asya account during the period when the organisation made the call for support (demonstrating a common stance with other members) and reduced his deposits during the withdrawal period (again acting in coordination with organisation members). Through these actions, it has been seen that the accused person complied with the directives and instructions of the leader of the organisation and had a hierarchical and organic connection with the organisation and its executives.”*

17. Consequently, in convicting the applicant as a result of the retrial, the Assize Court paid regard to all new pieces of evidence and made the following assessments:

*“When making an examination in respect of the case-file, it has been seen that (i) the accused person downloaded and used the ByLock program ‘for organisational purposes and as part of the organisation’s secret communication method’; (ii) the ByLock query report was taken as basis for this allegation; (iii) the ByLock query report, the findings and evaluation report obtained after the initial judgment, and the ByLock messages were all examined during the trial; (iv) an expert examination was conducted on the digital finding; (v) the accused person did not object to the expert examination with grounds as to the merits of these findings; (vi) there was no substantial objection regarding the reliability or accuracy of the HIS, CGNAT records or IP*

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*findings; and (vii) given the accused person's usage of the application (443 logins), it is not plausible that the application was downloaded accidentally or used only briefly. Having regard to the facts that during the proceedings, the defendant party did not file a substantial objection against the authenticity of these findings and the allegation was rejected in all aspects, the pieces of evidence taken as the basis for the accused person's conviction were duly examined during the hearings and accepted by our court as grounds for the judgment.*

*[...]*

*In determining the accused person's criminal liability within the scope of our case-file, the judgment was not based solely on the fact that he downloaded the ByLock application but, his continued use of the application from the date it was downloaded until 31 January 2016, his organisational communications through the programme, and the witness testimony identifying him as a member of the organisation."*

*[...]*

*"In the assessment concerning the issues noted and handled in the judgment rendered following the accused person's application lodged with the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR"), the ECtHR ruled that Article 7 of the Convention - the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege - had been violated, and noted that downloading and using a program not explicitly prohibited by law should not, in itself, lead to criminal prosecution or conviction. However, it is clear that the trial conducted by the first-instance court did not base its ruling solely on the act of downloading and installing the communication program but the use of this program for organisational communications, and that the acts taken as basis for the punishment are the continuous, diverse and intense organisational activities.*

*At this point, it is clear that the issue investigated by the investigating authorities and the act, for which a sentence was imposed by our court, were the accused's membership to the armed terrorist organisation and that the communication program used by the accused is an evidence beyond suspicion concerning membership of the relevant armed terrorist organisation. Contrary to the observation of the Court stating that except for ByLock usage there is no evidence concerning involvement in the hierarchical structure of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation; it has been acknowledged by our court that the accused*

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*downloaded the relevant application for organisational aims and continued to use it for the same aims, by taking into account the finding and evaluation report as well as findings with regard to contents on the basis of the change in the evidentiary situation at the legal remedy stage after the first decision of our court.*

*[...]*

*Moreover, it should be stated that; as regards the commission of the offence imputed on the accused it has been concluded that there is not only ByLock questioning report but also finding and evaluation report and also Bylock correspondences, in which it has been definitively found that the relevant program was downloaded and used by the accused, that the accused's correspondences with other members of the organisation were of organisational nature, that the accused's membership to the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation was supported by the statement and identification (confrontation) of the witness A.V. and that accordingly the applicant used the Bylock, namely secret communication means of the organisation, for organisational aims. In this regard, taking into account the evidence that emerged after the first decision of our court and that was summoned by our court and discussed during the retrial, it has been concluded that the evidentiary situation has changed -during and after the legal remedy stage- and that the newly emerging evidence does not require to depart from the evaluation (conclusion) in the first decision of our court in terms of the commission of the imputed offence (and the discussion of the legal elements of the imputed offence).*

*It has been reached the conclusion that ByLock is not the sole and/or decisive evidence for our court's observation that the offence imputed on the accused was found established and legal elements of the offence of membership to an armed terrorist organisation was constituted, and that the Bylock findings and evaluation report, organisational correspondences via the relevant program as well as the witness statement and identification, which indicated that the accused joined the organisation by knowing its aims, should be accepted as evidence in this regard. Having regard to not only the fact that he downloaded the bylock program but also that he included in the organisation hierarchy as well as his actions within the hierarchy of the organisation, a decision has been delivered as regards the commission of the offence imputed on the accused. As found established by the witness statement, the accused's relation with the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation began in 1999 and he committed the acts of "intense", "continuous"*

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*and “diverse” nature during 17/25 December 2013 and after the decision of the National Security Council dated 30 October 2014.*

*According to the statement and identification of the witness A.V., the accused continued to be included in the organisation after the secret aims of the FETÖ/PDY structure had been announced to the public and, he was in a situation that he could be aware of the final aims of the organisation and he could foresee that provision of Article 314/2 of the TCC be applied in respect of him. However, after the relevant dates, the accused continued his organisational behaviour by using ByLock for organisational aims -as understood from his ByLock correspondences-.*

*It should also be stated that; having regard to the fact that the accused was serving as a teacher - before his dismissal from public service-, that organisational instructions were sent to the accused after the real aims of the organisation had been known by the public and the organisation’s actions regarded as offence had been revealed, that the ByLock users, who gave instruction to the accused (E.İ. with ID number 199156 and Z.E. with ID number 339490 who sent to the accused mails involving organisational instruction) were teachers as the accused and that other persons added in the accused’s ByLock list were also teachers, it has been understood that the accused was within the teacher structure of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation. Indeed, such group communication (in view of the fact that the message or mail could be sent to the user if the user’s ID was known due to the nature of the application) is contrary to the natural flow of life. Moreover, the acceptance of the fact that this group came together by coincidence by means of downloading the said application from the internet source is contrary to the mind, logic and natural flow of life.*

*[...]*

*As justified above, it has been understood in the light of the finding and evaluation report in the case file and by taking into account the Bylock content findings stating that the accused was a user of secret Bylock program, which was proved to have been used by the members of the organisation, that he exchanged correspondences via ByLock -with regard to the fact that he was included in the hierarchical structure of the organisation by being aware of the organisation’s aims-, that he received order and instruction from the organisation’s executives, that he performed organisational actions along with the group called “conversation group, in which he was included, that according to the witness A.V.’s statement in the*

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*presence of defence counsel during the investigation and identification (confrontation) at the trial that these actions were spread over a large period of time, that the accused was aware of the secret aims of the organisation and continued to be in this organisation in view of the time period within the organisation and nature of the activities, that he received organisational instructions via ByLock and several mails, which were sent to prevent the members of the organisation from leaving it, were addressed to him after the final aim of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation and its actions constituting offence had been known by the public, that in view of the correspondences exchanged via this program, witness statements and Bank Asya accounting activities in compatible with the conducts of the members of the organisation, it has been found established that the accused was included in the hierarchical structure of the terrorist organisation by carrying out acts of diverse, continuous and intense nature and that he had become a member of the organisation by constituting an organic link therewith and that accordingly the imputed offence had been committed. Pursuant to Article 323/1 of the CCP, it has been considered necessary to uphold the conviction decision of 6 years and 3 months' dated 21 March 2017 and no. 2017/136-121 E. in respect of the accused Yüksel Yalçınkaya, which was delivered by our Court for the offence of membership of the armed terrorist organisation. As a manifestation of conscientious opinion of our court in the light of the foregoing, it is hereby decided as follows:*

**As regards the Court's finding on the violation of Article 7 of the Convention and Assize Court's examination and assessments within the scope of re-trial, the authorities would like to state the following:**

18. The Court found that, in the decision of violation, the applicant's conviction for the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation was established in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of domestic law and the principles of legality and foreseeability set out under Article 7 of the Convention. The Court considers that the domestic court did not duly establish all elements of the offence in an individualised manner while deciding on the applicant's conviction. In other words, the basis of the violation under Article 7 of the Convention is the domestic court's acknowledgment that the factual finding concerning ByLock usage was of a nature to comprise the elements of the offence of being a member of an armed terrorist organisation alone.
19. As seen above, the Assize Court discussed the evidential nature of Bylock in detail during the re-trial. The Assize Court did not accept the Bylock as the sole and decisive

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evidence. The Assize Court examined the ByLock findings and evaluation report as well as its content and, the witness statements were heard. Therefore, the domestic court examined other evidence, which was included in the case file following its initial decision. In the light of all these elements, the domestic court concluded **that the facts taken as the basis for sentencing the applicant were organisational actions of “intense”, “continuous” and “diverse” nature** and, decided on the applicant’s conviction. Within this framework, it has been seen that more comprehensive analysis of the evidence was carried out during re-trial and that the conviction was not associated with ByLock usage alone.

**As regards the Court’s finding on the violation of Article 6 of the Convention and the Assize Court’s examination and assessments within the scope of the re-trial, the authorities would like to state the following:**

20. The Court emphasised that the domestic courts had not made any statement as to the reason why and by whose decision the raw data of Bylock -especially the parts concerning the applicant- had not been provided and that, therefore, the applicant was deprived of the opportunity to submit counter-argument such as an objection to the validity of the relevant reasonings. Having regard to the critical importance of the raw ByLock data to the applicant’s case, the Court noted that the domestic courts’ failure to respond to the applicant’s request for such an independent examination – even if only to explain why such an independent examination was not deemed necessary – was problematic.
21. The Court considered that the domestic courts did not examine the arguments concerning the fact that the Bylock evidence was unlawful and unreliable, that the domestic court rendered a decision without awaiting the data, which were included in the case file following the finalisation of the applicant’s conviction, in other words without the finding and evaluation report being presented to the applicant. The Court is also of the opinion that in view of the fact that the accused could not challenge the arguments directly on the basis of the ByLock data at the prosecution’s disposal to contest the accuracy of the allegations raised against him, the domestic courts should support them with sufficient and pertinent reasoning and address the applicant’s objections regarding their accuracy.
22. As seen above, by referring to the correspondence of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor's Office dated 29 November 2023 within the scope of the re-trial, the Assize Court noted that Bylock raw data was of a holistic nature concerning the whole

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investigations and prosecutions for the membership of the terrorist organisation and that the examinations and assessments on these data still continued. Therefore, the Assize Court took into account the possibility that the integrity of such data could be impaired if they were provided to the defence for examination within the scope of any file and decided that there was no contravention of law or procedure in dismissing the applicant's relevant request.

23. The Assize Court took several evidence as the basis for the allegation that the accused downloaded the ByLock for organisational aims by being included in the organisation's secret communication method and that he used Bylock for the relevant aim. In this scope, the Bylock questioning report, the finding and evaluation report obtained after the first judgment as well as Bylock correspondences were discussed at the hearing and, also the expert examination was conducted concerning digital findings.
24. The trial court took into account that there has been no substantive objection against HIS and CGNAT records as well as IP findings. Taking all of these issues into consideration, the trial court concluded that the Bylock could not be downloaded by chance or used for a short period of time on the ground that the number of the accused's log in the application was 443.
25. The Assize Court obtained also expert report concerning Bank Asya account activities and explained, in detail, its conclusion concerning depositing money upon the organisation's instruction and being withdrawn money in accordance with the organisation's instruction.

**As regards the Court's finding on violation of Article 11 of the Convention and Assize Court's examination and assessments in this regard, the authorities would like to state the followings:**

26. The Court stated that the applicant's membership in the association, even if considered as supporting evidence for membership in the organisation within the case file, constitutes a violation of Article 11 of the Convention.
27. In light of the above-mentioned issues, the authorities considered that the domestic court eliminated the shortcomings stated in the Court's decision.
28. Moreover, the authorities would like to draw the Committee of Ministers to the fact that the relevant decision has not become final yet, that the case file is still at the stage of appeal on points of facts and law, that subsequently it will be at the stage of appeal before the Court of Cassation and that therefore the proceedings is still on-going.
29. The authorities will inform the Committee of any new developments in this regard.

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### III. GENERAL MEASURES

30. At the outset, the Turkish authorities would like to recall the seriousness of the situation in the aftermath of the coup attempt as a contextual factor. The attempted coup brought before the judiciary such legal issues that had never been encountered before in the history of the Republic of Türkiye. These legal issues became even more complex due to the technological means used by criminals.
31. The Court itself pointed out that it was aware of the difficulties associated with the fight against terrorism and those that States encounter in the light of the changing methods and tactics used in the commission of terrorist offences. It, furthermore, acknowledged the unique challenges faced by the Turkish authorities and courts in the context of their efforts against the FETÖ/PDY, having regard to the atypical nature of that organisation, which pursued its aims covertly rather than through traditional terrorist methods (see *Yalçınkaya*, no. 15669/20, § 269, 26 September 2023).
32. The Court reiterated in this connection the finding it had made in a number of cases, and endorsed in the present case, that the attempted military coup in Türkiye disclosed the existence of a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation” within the meaning of the Convention. Therefore, it recognised the urgency and severity of the situation that the authorities and courts had to grapple with in the aftermath of the coup attempt (see, *ibid*, § 269).
33. In light of the above, the following explanations are provided under the relevant Articles of the Convention where the Court found violations, outlining the issues identified.

#### A. Violation of Article 7 of the Convention

34. In its assessment under Article 7 § 1 of the Convention, the Court examined whether there had been a valid legal basis for the applicant’s conviction and, in particular, whether the conclusion reached by the relevant domestic courts had been compatible with the object and purpose of that provision (see, *ibid*, § 241).
35. In its judgment, the Court noted that it was not its task under Article 7 of the Convention to establish whether the applicant had actually performed the acts imputed to him – in particular, whether he had actually used the ByLock application, which he denied – or to rule on his individual criminal responsibility, those being primarily matters for the domestic courts (see, *ibid*, § 243).
36. It underlined that its task was rather to consider, from the standpoint of Article 7, whether the applicant’s conviction complied with the principles of legality and foreseeability enshrined in that provision (see, *ibid*, § 243).



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37. In the instant case, the applicant was convicted of membership of an armed terrorist organisation. The Court therefore first examined whether at the time of the acts attributed to him such an offence had been clearly set out in domestic law (see, *ibid*, § 244).
38. Having regard to the relevant legislative provisions and their interpretation by the domestic courts, the Court considered that the offence of which the applicant had been convicted was codified and defined under Turkish law, in keeping with the principle of legality under Article 7 of the Convention (see, *ibid*, § 249).
39. Thus, the Court concluded that Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code, particularly when read in conjunction with the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the case-law of the Court of Cassation, was, in principle, formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to know, if need be with appropriate legal advice, what acts and omissions would make him criminally liable (see, *ibid*, § 249). In conclusion, the Court found no problem with the relevant domestic legislation in the context of Article 7 of the Convention.
40. Dismissing the applicant's arguments, the Court found that the assessment and designation of FETÖ/PDY as a terrorist organisation by the domestic courts was not incompatible with the Convention and the law (see, *ibid*, §§ 251-254). The Court further conducted an examination of the applicant's conviction for membership of the FETÖ/PDY in the present case. The Court noted in this regard that the applicant's conviction for membership of the FETÖ/PDY was mainly based on the findings that he had used the ByLock messaging application (see, *ibid*, § 257).
41. The Court made significant assessments on the connection between the ByLock and the FETÖ/PDY. In this regard, it noted in particular the findings regarding the profile of some users of the application, the content of the decrypted communications, statements made by suspects in other FETÖ/PDY-related investigations confirming its use within the organisation, and the statements of the licence owner of the application noting, with hindsight, that it had been developed for the use of the FETÖ/PDY. The Court held, accordingly, that ByLock was not just any ordinary commercial messaging application, and that its use could *prima facie* suggest some kind of connection with the FETÖ/PDY (see, *ibid*, § 259).
42. Therefore, the Court held that it needed to verify whether the relevant constituent elements of the offence, and in particular the subjective, or mental, element, had been duly established in the applicant's respect, in keeping with the requirements of the

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applicable law, and whether the assessment by the domestic courts of these constituent elements in the applicant's case had represented a foreseeable, and not an expansive, interpretation and application of the criminal provision in question (see, *ibid*, § 260).

43. The Court explained its assessment on this matter as follows:

*... Admittedly, the assessment of the relevance or the weight attached to a particular piece of evidence is not, in principle, within the remit of the Court under Article 7 of the Convention. It considers, however, that over and above its evidential value, the finding regarding the use of ByLock here effectively replaced an individualised finding as to the presence of the constituent material and mental elements of the offence, thereby bypassing the requirements of Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code – as interpreted by the Court of Cassation itself – in contravention of the principle of legality and bringing the matter within the realm of Article 7 (see, *ibid*, § 262).*

*The Court points in this connection to the absence of any meaningful explanation in the relevant domestic court judgments as to certain matters that went to the essence of the offence ... (see, *ibid*, § 263).*

*The interpretation adopted by the domestic courts rather seems to presuppose the very conclusions to which it purports to lead, in that it treats them as flowing automatically from the mere use of ByLock. In so doing, it effectively imputes criminal responsibility to a user of that application without establishing that all the requirements of membership of an armed terrorist organisation (including the necessary intent) have been fulfilled. In the Court's view, this is not only incompatible with the essence of the offence in question, which requires proof of an organic link based on continuity, diversity and intensity and the presence of a very specific mental element, but is also irreconcilable with the right of an individual, under Article 7 of the Convention, not to be punished without the existence of a mental link through which an element of personal liability may be established (see, *ibid*, § 264).*

*The Court stresses that this finding under Article 7 does not as such concern the relevance of the ByLock evidence to establishing the applicant's guilt to the required standard of proof. The issue here is rather that, to all intents and purposes, the factual finding regarding the use of ByLock alone was considered to have made out the constituent elements of the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation. It is moreover clear from the domestic court judgments and the Government's submissions that the other acts attributed to the applicant had very limited bearing on the outcome (see, *ibid*, § 268).*

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44. As is seen, the Court made its assessment on the basis of the judgments and decisions rendered in the present case.
45. In this regard, the Government would like to provide up-to-date information concerning the current judicial practice:
46. According to the established case-law of the Court of Cassation, in order for a person to be convicted of membership of a terrorist organisation, (i) the existence of an organic link between the person and the organisation must be established on the basis of the continuity, diversity and intensity of the person's activities, and (ii) it must be demonstrated that the person acted knowingly and willingly within the hierarchical structure of the organisation. The Constitutional Court has also referred to this piece of case-law of the Court of Cassation in many of its judgments (see, *ibid*, § 184).
47. According to the established domestic judicial practice, a member of an organisation is a person who embraces the objectives of the organisation, becomes a part of the hierarchical structure of the organisation, and thus relinquishes his/her will in favour of that of the organisation by being ready to discharge the duties to be entrusted by the organisation. Membership of an organisation means joining it, affiliation with it and subordination to the hierarchical power prevailing in the organisation. A member of the organisation must have an organic link with it and participate in its activities. An organic link, which is the most important element of membership, is a link which is vivid, transitive and active. It makes a perpetrator available for commands and instructions, and determines his/her hierarchical position. In the case of aiding an organisation or committing an offence on behalf of an organisation, there are commands or instructions given by ranking members or other members of the organisation<sup>1</sup>.
48. In order for the constitution of the offence of being a member of an armed organisation, there must exist an organic link with the organisation and as a rule, there must exist acts and activities of a continuous, diverse and intense character. However, the perpetrators of the offences that can only be committed by the members of the organisation must also be considered as members of that organisation, even if these offences do not have the characteristics of continuity, diversity and intensity in terms of their nature, the way they are committed, the severity of the harm and danger that occurs and their contribution to the aims and interests of the organisation. Actions such as simply

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<sup>1</sup> See, among a large number of judgments containing assessments on membership of a terrorist organisation, the judgments of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation nos. E.2022/1757, K.2024/7246; E.2022/40228, K. 2024/6987.

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sympathising with an organisation or adopting the aims, values and ideology of that organisation, reading and holding possession of the related publications, or respecting the leader of the organisation are not sufficient for being a member of that organisation<sup>2</sup>.

49. The Government would like to emphasise that the Court found no problem with respect to the domestic legislative provision governing the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation, i.e. Article 314 of the Criminal Code, in the context of Article 7 of the Convention (see, *ibid*, § 249 and paragraphs 38-39 above). The Court also did not criticise the case-law of the Court of Cassation on the subject which has been developed over many years, some examples from which are mentioned above. The issue that led the Court to find a violation was the fact that the established judicial practice had not been properly followed in the particular case involving the ByLock application.

50. At this point the authorities note that the current practice and case-law of the Turkish judicial authorities show that a practice compatible with the principles laid down by the Court has become established. In this context, samples of recent judicial decisions on the matter are presented below.

#### **i) First-Instance Courts**

51. The incident giving rise to the decision of the Erzurum 4<sup>th</sup> Assize Court dated 27 October 2020 read as follows: In the proceedings conducted for the suspicion of the accused's being a Bylock user and a member of the terrorist organisation, it has been decided on the accused's acquittal. The Assize Court made the following assessments in its judgment:

“[...]

*The offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation means joining it, affiliating with it and being subordinated to the hierarchical power prevailing in the organisation. Accordingly, the individual has been deemed to have accepted the membership of the organisation by joining an organisation. In this respect, in order for the offence of membership of the organisation set out in Article 314/2 of the TCC to be constituted, there must exist an armed organisation, which was established to commit offences set out in paragraph 1 of this article, or the status of the executives of such an organisation must be legally evident in a way that does not allow any hesitation. Those*

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<sup>2</sup> See, among a large number of judgments containing assessments on membership of a terrorist organisation, the judgments of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation nos. E.2022/1757, K.2024/7246; E.2022/40228, K. 2024/6987.

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*who join the organisation must have joined it by knowing and adopting the purpose of the organisation and must enter into a relationship for the purpose of being included in the structure. The main criterion for the existence of the offence of membership of an organisation is the fact that the person becomes a part of the organisation's hierarchical structure with his own consent (organic link criterion). Moreover, the criterion of continuity, diversity and intensity of the accused's actions and the criterion of the nature of the action (the criterion on the basis of the presumption) are exceptional criteria adjunct to the organic link criterion in terms of the material element of the offence of membership of the organisation. As a result of the investigations and prosecutions conducted in respect of the accused;*

*It has been understood that there has been no allegation and evidence stating that the accused deposited money into Bank Asya upon the instruction, accommodated in the organisation's houses, took part in the conversations and conducted similar activities, which were accepted as an evidence for membership of FETÖ/PDY terrorist organisation and constituted importance in financial structure of the organisation.*

*In this context, the sole allegation in respect of the accused is the fact that he used ByLock program, which was secret communication system of the terrorist organisation. In its decision dated 27 April 2018 and no. 2018/159 E., 2018/1340 K., and decision dated 06 June 2018 and no. 2018/732 E.. and no. 2018/1859 and similar decisions, the 16<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation stated, in brief, that the reports issued by the police departments and/or HTS (CGNAT) records obtained from the BTK were not sufficient alone, that the detailed bylock findings and evaluation report should be provided by the relevant units and be discussed at the hearing.*

*As regards the accused, the relevant bylock findings and evaluation report could not be provided even though it has been repeatedly requested by our Court. While the relevant situation causes hesitation as to whether the accused was a bylock user, it has been stated as a result of the examination on CGNAT records that the accused logged into between 11.03.2015-26.06.2015, that it has been seen a total of 90 connections to IP addresses of the ByLock server were made and that the total duration of these connections is expressed in seconds. In this context, it is not possible to state that these connections, the contents of which could not be established, are of intense nature to reveal the applicant's use of ByLock for organisational aims.*

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*For all these reasons, it has been concluded by our Court that it could not be definitively established as to whether the accused used the ByLock and that the suspicion in this regard should be considered in favour of the accused, that the alleged issue in respect of the accused -who can not be accepted to use the Bylock, namely one of the decisive evidence for the membership of a terrorist organisation, can not be established that he committed any clear and decisive organisational activity and in respect of whom no information could be provided that he used the code name or similar organisational symbols- as well as the criteria of intensity, continuity and diversity of the acts were not fulfilled in respect of the accused, that accordingly no sufficient evidence was found to sentence the accused for the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation. Pursuant to Article 223/2-e of the CCP, it has been decided that the applicant be acquitted. It is hereby decided as follows:*

The appeal on points of fact and law (istinaf) against the relevant decision was dismissed by the Regional Court of Appeal; at the appellate review of the decision, on 30 October 2024 the 3<sup>rd</sup> Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the decision and the acquittal decision became final. (see Annex 2).

52. The incident giving rise to the decision of İstanbul 36<sup>th</sup> Assize Court dated 27 October 2022 read as follows: Within the scope of the case file, the accused accepted in his statement that while preparing a project he installed Bylock in his cellphone upon recommendation of his friend but he did not have any relation with the organisation. The Assize Court decided on acquittal of the accused, in respect of whom no finding and assessment report was found and whose USER ID could not be established. The decision noted as follows:

*“...“Even though a criminal case has been brought before our Court against the accused, requesting that he be sentenced for the offence of “Membership of an armed terrorist organisation; it has been understood that the USER ID number, which demonstrated that he used Bylock, and Bylock contents could not be established, that no finding and evaluation report in respect of the accused was found, that the accused indicated in his statements taken before our court that he downloaded the ByLock from Apple Store upon the recommendation of Ö.Ö., with whom he met in a university project, that however he did not use it and deleted it, that he could not think that this program belonged to the organisation and the organisational correspondences were exchanged in this program, and that he did not install it upon the instruction of the organisation,*

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*that it could not be reached a definite conclusion within the scope of the case file that the accused used the program called Bylock, which was established to be used by the members of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation and exclusively used by certain members of the organisation...”*

The appeal on points of law and facts against the relevant decision was dismissed by the Regional Court of Appeal. On 24 October 2024 the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the decision during the appeal examination of the decision and the acquittal decision became final (see Annex 3).

53. In another case, the facts underlying the judgment of the Burdur Assize Court dated 3 April 2019 were as follows: On the basis of the findings and evaluation report, it was established beyond any doubt that the accused person was a user of the ByLock application. However, in his defence, the accused person stated that he had used ByLock at the request of a person with whom he had been in contact for the purpose of marriage and who, at the time, had been affiliated with the structure referred to as the community (*cemaat*), but denied any connection with the organisation and did not accept the charges. The Assize Court acquitted the accused person on the grounds that, although his use of ByLock had been established, he had not used it for organisational purposes. It made the following assessments in this regard:

*“...as explained in detail above, although it has been understood that the accused person was a user of the encrypted communication application known as ByLock, his statement that he had allowed the application to be installed on his phone believing it to be an ordinary messaging application has been found to be credible. In view of the entire case file, the defence arguments and submissions, the witness statements, and other documents and information, it has been understood that the accused person’s defence was consistent, coherent, and sincere at all stages of the proceedings. No evidence has been found to contradict his assertion that he used the application in the belief that it was an ordinary messaging application or to indicate that he used it for organisational purposes.”*

The appeal on points of facts and law (*istinaf*) lodged against the judgment was rejected by the Regional Court of Appeal, and on 9 October 2024, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment on appeal, thereby rendering the acquittal decision final (see Annex 4).

54. In another case, the facts underlying the judgment of the Ankara 28<sup>th</sup> Assize Court dated 27 December 2022 were as follows: The Assize Court acquitted the accused person in

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the criminal proceedings brought against him on suspicion of being a ByLock user and a member of a terrorist organisation. In its judgment, the Assize Court made the following assessments:

*“As regards the suspects with no established affiliation or connection with the organisation but whose GSM lines were found to have connections to ByLock IP addresses without an associated ByLock ID, it is possible that such connections may have been established without the knowledge of the line owner, either through other members of the organisation accessing the internet via the relevant person’s Wi-Fi network, or that signals may have been received from ByLock IP addresses via the use of applications similar to “Mor Beyin” which generate links. Therefore, any doubts in this regard must be interpreted in favour of the accused person.*

*In the present case, despite all investigative efforts, no affiliation or connection of the accused person with the armed terrorist organisation could be established. Furthermore, when the individuals with whom the accused person communicated before or after the initial connection to ByLock IP addresses were checked against the UYAP database of organised crimes, no evidence was found to indicate that the accused person had been in contact with any known member of the organisation. Therefore, since no connection between the accused person and the organisation could be established and in the absence of any conclusive and convincing evidence sufficient to convict him and capable of forming a personal opinion beyond any doubt to demonstrate that he was a ByLock user and that he had established an organic link with the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation and acted under its hierarchical structure....”*

The appeal on points of facts and law (*istinaf*) lodged against the judgment was rejected by the Regional Court of Appeal, and on 2 October 2024, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment on appeal, thereby rendering the acquittal decision final (see Annex 5).

55. In another case, on 12 January 2021 the Ankara 19<sup>th</sup> Assize Court tried and acquitted an accused person whose registered mobile phone line, according to the CGNAT records, had connected to ByLock servers. The Assize Court held that the most significant piece of evidence in the case file was the CGNAT records concerning the determination of whether the accused person was a ByLock user. However, it emphasised that, as CGNAT records contained summarised data, they were not, in and of themselves, sufficient to prove that the accused person was an actual ByLock user. The Assize Court



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further noted that no other evidence of the accused person's contact with the FETÖ/PDY Armed Terrorist Organisation could be obtained and that there was no sufficient, conclusive and convincing evidence beyond any doubt that the accused person had established an organic link with the armed terrorist organisation, had been a part of its hierarchical structure, and had carried out activities involving diversity, continuity and intensity in line with the objectives and instructions of the organisation. Accordingly, the Assize Court ordered the accused person's acquittal. The appeal on points of facts and law (*istinaf*) lodged against the judgment was rejected by the Regional Court of Appeal, and on 7 October 2024, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment on appeal, thereby rendering the acquittal decision final (see Annex 6).

56. The Gümüşhane Assize Court, in its ruling dated 10 January 2019, tried and acquitted an accused person whose mobile phone line registered in his/her name had connected to ByLock servers 51 times according to CGNAT records. In its judgment, the Assize Court referred to the case-law of the Court of Cassation and stated that in order for the offence to be constituted, it was important for the accused to join the network with the instruction of the organisation and to use the software for communication purposes to ensure confidentiality. The Assize Court further indicated that the alleged use of the ByLock software, for which there was no findings and evaluation report and the content of which could not be ascertained, could not, by itself, constitute conclusive evidence establishing the existence of the criminal elements of continuity, diversity and intensity, which are required for the charge of membership of an armed terrorist organisation to be proven. On these grounds, the trial court acquitted the accused person. Upon the public prosecutor's appeal on points of facts and law, the 6<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Erzurum Regional Court of Appeal rejected the appeal on 5 March 2020, and upon cassation review, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the acquittal in its decision of 23 February 2023, thus rendering a final decision (see Annex 7).

57. The Düzcce 2<sup>nd</sup> Assize Court, in its ruling dated 3 December 2019, tried and acquitted an accused person whose mobile phone line registered in his/her name had connected to ByLock servers according to CGNAT records. In its judgment, the Assize Court referred to the case-law of the Court of Cassation and stated that in order for the offence to be constituted, it was important for the accused to join the network with the instruction of the organisation and to use the software for communication purposes to

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ensure confidentiality. The Assize Court further indicated that the alleged use of the ByLock software, for which there was no findings and evaluation report and the content of which could not be ascertained, could not, by itself, constitute conclusive evidence of the quality required for the charge of membership of an armed terrorist organisation to be proven. On these grounds, the trial court acquitted the accused person. Upon the cassation appeal requested by the public prosecutor, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the acquittal in its decision of 19 January 2023, thus rendering a final decision (see Annex 8).

58. The Ankara 20<sup>th</sup> Assize Court, in its ruling dated 29 June 2020, tried and acquitted an accused person whose mobile phone line registered in his/her name had connected to ByLock servers 12 times according to CGNAT records. In its judgment, the Assize Court referred to the case-law of the Court of Cassation and stated that in order for the offence to be constituted, it was important for the accused to join the network with the instruction of the organisation and to use the software for communication purposes to ensure confidentiality. The Assize Court further indicated that the alleged use of the ByLock software, for which there was no findings and evaluation report and the content of which could not be ascertained, could not, by itself, constitute conclusive evidence establishing the existence of the elements of continuity, diversity and intensity, which are required for the charge of membership of an armed terrorist organisation to be proven. On these grounds, the trial court acquitted the accused person. Upon the public prosecutor's appeal on points of facts and law, the 4<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Appeal rejected the appeal on 26 November 2021, and upon cassation review, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the acquittal in its decision of 17 January 2024, thus rendering a final decision (see Annex 9).

59. The Ankara 29<sup>th</sup> Assize Court, in its ruling dated 13 July 2021, tried and acquitted an accused person whose mobile phone line registered in his/her name had connected to ByLock servers 109 times according to CGNAT and HTS records. The Assize Court made the following assessments in its judgment:

*“ByLock user information is determined through the IP addresses registered on the ByLock server; the determination of the User-ID numbers of the users registered on the ByLock server and the analysis of the e-mail/message contents can be made with the ByLock findings and evaluation report, which is important for determining the legal status of the accused. The CGNAT (HIS) records, which are a kind of metadata, serve*

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*as a trace and sign, but are not sufficient by themselves to show that the person concerned is an actual ByLock user....*

*... considering that it is detected according to the discovered CGNAT records that the person was directed to the IP addresses of the ByLock application, if the User-ID number and password of the person cannot be identified, it cannot be determined only on the basis of the CGNAT records whether the person is one of the actual ByLock users whose User-ID and password have not yet been identified or simply one of the people who were directed to the ByLock servers through trap methods.*

*[Our court has taken note of] the expert report dated 13 January 2020 on whether the accused was connected to the ByLock software on the basis of the HTS, CGNAT and internet traffic record information of the phone number used by the accused, which were added into the case file, and*

*the report indicating that the phone line no. 0546 ... established communication and connection with the IP address belonging to the ByLock servers/systems 109 times in different time periods; that the CGNAT and GPRS/WAP base station information matched with each other; and that the findings in the ByLock database query report and the HTS record contents matched each other.*

*The only basis for the allegation that the accused used the ByLock software is the CGNAT (HIS) records, and since the CGNAT (HIS) records are only summary data, they alone are not sufficient to show that the accused is an actual ByLock user. At the end of the trial, **considering that a findings and evaluation report showing that the accused had used the ByLock software by creating a user name and password could not be submitted to the case file, that no [incriminating] witness or suspect statement against the accused was entered into the case file,***

*... and no other evidence of the accused person's contact with the FETÖ/PDY Armed Terrorist Organisation could be obtained, [our court reaches the conclusion that] **there is no sufficient, conclusive and convincing evidence beyond any doubt that the accused formed an organic link with the armed terrorist organisation, that he took part in its hierarchical structure, and that he carried out activities involving diversity, continuity and intensity in line with the objectives and instructions of the organisation.***"

60. In this judgment, the Assize Court, in sum, deemed the findings and evaluation report is of crucial importance to determine that the accused was a ByLock user. The Assize Court, as a result, acquitted the accused on the grounds that there was no evidence that

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the suspect had engaged in activities involving continuity, diversity and intensity in line with the objectives and instructions of the organisation. Upon the public prosecutor's appeal on points of facts and law, the 4<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Appeal rejected the appeal on 9 December 2022, and upon cassation review, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the acquittal in its decision of 2 April 2024, thus rendering a final decision (see Annex 10).

61. The Ankara 17<sup>th</sup> Assize Court, in its ruling dated 25 February 2021, tried and acquitted an accused person whose mobile phone line registered in his/her name had connected to ByLock servers according to CGNAT records. In its judgment, the Assize Court referred to the case-law of the Court of Cassation and stated that in order for the offence to be constituted, it was important for the accused to join the network with the instruction of the organisation and to use the software for communication purposes to ensure confidentiality. The Assize Court followed that it must be certainly demonstrated, through the ByLock findings and evaluation report and the CGNAT records indicating USER ID, password and similar elements, that the accused person had connected to, and used, the ByLock system with a view to maintaining organisational confidentiality and ensuring communication. The Assize Court further indicated that the alleged use of the ByLock software, for which there was no findings and evaluation report and the content of which could not be ascertained, could not, by itself, constitute conclusive evidence establishing the existence of the criminal elements of continuity, diversity and intensity, which are required for the charge of membership of an armed terrorist organisation to be proven. On these grounds, the trial court acquitted the accused person. Upon the public prosecutor's appeal on points of facts and law, the 21<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Appeal rejected the appeal on 29 June 2022, and upon cassation review, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the acquittal in its decision of 21 March 2024, thus rendering a final decision (see Annex 11).

62. As can be seen from the sample judgments presented above, the first-instance courts pay attention to whether the criteria for membership of an organisation, which are emphasised by the Court in the present case as well, notably proof of an organic link based on continuity, diversity and intensity and the presence of a mental element. When these elements are not present, an acquittal decision is rendered since the constituent elements of the offence in question do not exist. There are many similar rulings handed by the first-instance courts that are also upheld by the Court of Cassation on these

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grounds. It does not seem possible to present all of these rulings due to the extent of the action plan. Nonetheless, 13 examples of similar rulings are enclosed herewith (see Annexes 12-24).

**ii) Decisions of Regional Courts of Appeal and the Court of Cassation**

63. Furthermore, in cases where the above-mentioned criteria for membership of an organisation are not applied by the first-instance courts in line with the case-law of the Court of Cassation, such judgments are quashed by the Court of Cassation or the Regional Courts of Appeal, thereby a uniform practice is ensured. In this context, some of the quashing decisions are presented below:

64. In its decision dated 8 September 2020, the 8<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Samsun Regional Court of Appeal quashed the conviction of the accused person, who had been found guilty at first instance of membership of a terrorist organisation, and ordered his acquittal. In its decision, the Regional Court of Appeal emphasised that, despite the existence of 7,046 logins to ByLock, there was no findings and evaluation report concerning the accused person's use of ByLock. It held that it had not been established that the accused person had used ByLock for the purpose of intra-organisational communication. Furthermore, it found that the case file contained no other evidence indicating that the accused person had any connection with the organisation in question. Taking all these factors into consideration, the Regional Court of Appeal ordered the accused person's acquittal. The decision noted as follows:

*"It is understood that the primary piece of evidence against the accused person, who denied the charges against him at all stages of the proceedings, was the allegation of his use of ByLock, that the alleged use was in the form of 7,046 logins to ByLock between 6 September 2014 and 12 May 2015, and that no findings and evaluation report concerning his use of ByLock could be obtained despite the passage of a significant amount of time. In this context, and in line with the jurisprudence which has become settled through judicial decisions, it could not be technically demonstrated that the use of ByLock via the relevant GMS line had been carried out by the accused person for the purpose of intra-organisational communication. Moreover, no other evidence indicating that the accused person had any affiliation with the structure in question was submitted to the file. In view of these factors, it is understood that the allegation that the accused person was a member of the FETÖ/PDY terrorist organisation remained at the level of mere suspicion in light of the available evidence. Accordingly, it is concluded*

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*that the accused person should be acquitted of the imputed offence and that the first-instance judgment convicting him should be quashed...”*

65. The cassation appeal (*temyiz*) lodged against the decision was rejected by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation on 24 October 2024. Thus, the acquittal decision became final (see Annex 25).

66. On 10 November 2021 the 2<sup>nd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Samsun Regional Court of Appeal ordered the acquittal of the accused person. In its decision, the Regional Court of Appeal emphasised that there was no findings and evaluation report concerning the accused person’s use of ByLock. It held that it had not been established with certainty that the use of ByLock had been carried out by the accused person for the purpose of intra-organisational communication. Furthermore, it found that the case file contained no other evidence indicating that the accused person had any connection with the organisation in question. Taking all these factors into consideration, the Regional Court of Appeal ordered the accused person’s acquittal. The decision noted as follows:

*“Although the accused person was alleged to be a user of ByLock, namely the secret communication application of the organisation, it is understood that no detailed ByLock findings and evaluation report concerning his use of ByLock and including the USER ID, password, and group members was drawn up at any stage of the proceedings. In view of the fact that the accused person’s use of ByLock could not be established on the basis of technical data as set out in the case-law of the 16<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, that the accused person consistently denied the charges against him throughout the proceedings and asserted that he had not used the ByLock application, that there exists no evidence against him apart from his having social security registration with an affiliated institution and his participation in a demonstration/protest organised by the terrorist organisation in reaction to the arrest of certain columnists from the newspaper Zaman, that these acts may be considered to indicate sympathy for or an affiliation with the organisation but would not constitute the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation, that the accused person’s use of the organisation’s secret communication application could not be established with certainty through technical data, and that no concrete, conclusive, and convincing evidence beyond reasonable doubt could be obtained to prove that the accused person was a member of FETÖ, it is concluded that, in accordance with the principle of “in dubio pro reo”, the accused person should be acquitted of the imputed offence. It is hereby decided as follows:”*

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67. The cassation appeal (*temyiz*) lodged against the decision was rejected by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation on 9 October 2024. Thus, the acquittal decision became final (see Annex 26).

68. Similarly, in its decision dated 23 January 2020, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Istanbul Regional Court of Appeal quashed the conviction of the accused person, who had been found guilty at first instance of membership of a terrorist organisation, and ordered his acquittal. The decision noted as follows:

*“As regards the charge of membership of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation against the accused person, it was solely alleged that the accused person had used ByLock and a CGNAT record showing a connection with the ByLock servers was established. However, there is a suspicion that such a connection may have been established through redirection methods as explained above. Therefore, the existence of a detailed ByLock findings and evaluation report is essential for proving the offence in question. Despite the passage of a considerable amount of time since the initiation of the investigation against the accused person, no user ID, password, or content could be identified. Criminal proceedings are based on the principle that the accused person must be tried on the basis of the available evidence. It is not possible to conduct a fair trial within a reasonable time while awaiting evidence which is not currently available and involves uncertainty as to whether or when it will be available. Since the offence imputed to the accused person could not be proven, and in accordance with the principle of “in dubio pro reo”, which constitutes the fundamental principle of criminal law, it is decided that the first-instance judgment convicting the accused person be quashed and that the accused person be acquitted.”*

The cassation appeal (*temyiz*) lodged against the decision was rejected by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation on 30 October 2024. Thus, the acquittal decision became final (see Annex 27).

69. **As can be seen, the regional courts of appeal carry out their assessments in line with the Court’s case-law and deliver their decisions accordingly. Similarly, the Court of Cassation, as the highest appellate court, issues decisions within the framework of the Convention and the case-law of the Court, thereby ensuring the establishment of a Convention-compliant practice across the country.**

70. On 26 December 2024 the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in its quashing decision on the cassation appeal filed by the accused, who had been found to be a ByLock user, noted as follows (see Annex 28):

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*“As indicated in the decision of the (abolished) 16<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, acting as a first-instance court, dated 24 April 2017 and numbered E.2015/3 and K.2017/3, which became final following the upholding decision of the Plenary Court of Cassation in Criminal Matters dated 26 September 2017 and numbered E.2017/16-956 and K.2017/970, and in the decision of the Constitutional Court dated 4 June 2020 on the individual application of Ferhat Kara (no. 2018/15231), since the ByLock communication system is a network designed specifically for use by members of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation and is used exclusively by certain members thereof, it is beyond doubt that the ByLock communication system will constitute evidence of an individual’s connection to the organisation, provided that it is established on the basis of technical data capable of leading to a conclusion beyond any doubt that the individual joined this network upon instruction from the organisation and used it for communication in order to maintain secrecy.*

*However, in view of the facts of the case, the allegations, the acknowledgement of the court, and the entire case file, it is understood that the accused person denied using ByLock in her defence submissions during the proceedings and stated that she had not actually worked at a company affiliated with the organisation and that it was her spouse who had registered her for social security. It is further understood that the ByLock findings and evaluation report included in the file referred only to the accused person’s spouse Levent Y. and that the accused person had communicated via ByLock solely with her spouse Levent Y. Given that no concrete, conclusive, and entirely convincing evidence, free from any doubt, was obtained to indicate that the accused person had used the ByLock application for organisational purposes, the judgment convicting her as a result of a mistake in the assessment of the evidence, instead of a decision to acquit her of the imputed offence, has been found ...”*

71. In the decision in question, by taking into account the other evidence contained in the case file, the Court of Cassation accepted the accused person’s defence that she had used ByLock solely for the purpose of communicating with her spouse and that she had no organisational affiliation. In other words, while the Court of Cassation found it established that the accused person was a ByLock user, it concluded that there was no sufficient and conclusive evidence to demonstrate that such use served an organisational purpose. In line with this assessment, the Court of Cassation considered that the conviction of the accused person of membership of an organisation would not be lawful.



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It thus quashed the lower court's judgment and held that the accused person should be acquitted.

72. This approach demonstrates that, in its assessment of evidence, the Court of Cassation does not rely solely on technical findings, but also takes into account the accused person's purpose of use and the other relevant evidence. The Court of Cassation emphasises that in order for a person to be convicted of membership of a terrorist organisation, it must be established that the person established an organic link with the organisation through activities involving continuity, diversity, and intensity and acted knowingly and willingly within the hierarchical structure of the organisation.

73. On 10 December 2024 the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in its quashing decision on the cassation appeal filed by the accused, who had been found to be a ByLock user, noted as follows (see Annex 29):

*"In view of the fact that the accused person did not admit to being a ByLock user, that the ByLock findings and evaluation report included only two of his siblings in the contact list, that no content was available, and that his sibling G.B. listed in the accused person's ByLock contacts submitted a petition to the case file asserting that he had downloaded the ByLock application onto the accused person's phone without his knowledge and later deleted it because it was not functional, it is understood that there is no conclusive evidence beyond any doubt to indicate that the accused person used ByLock for organisational purposes and that there are no organisational acts or activities attributed to the accused person apart from the allegation of his use of ByLock. Accordingly, in the absence of concrete and conclusive evidence beyond any doubt to demonstrate that the accused person joined the hierarchical structure of the organisation and became a member thereof, and in the light of the fact that the offence attributed to him could not be considered proven, the accused person should have been acquitted pursuant to Article 223 § 2 (e) of the Law no. 5271. However, it was decided that..."*

74. In the judgment in question, the Court of Cassation found the defendant's defense—that he had no connection with the terrorist organization—credible, taking into account other evidence in the case file as well. In other words, although it was established that the defendant had used ByLock, the Court of Cassation concluded that this use was not for organisational purposes and quashed the judgment, considering that the defendant should be acquitted.

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75. On 3 December 2024 the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in its quashing decision on the cassation appeal filed by the accused, who had been found to be a ByLock user, noted as follows (see Annex 30):

*“In cases where it is established beyond any doubt through technical data that the accused person, who does not admit to being a ByLock user, indeed used the ByLock application, then such evidence becomes decisive in proving the offence in question. Accordingly, a detailed ByLock findings and evaluation report should be obtained from the relevant authorities, efforts should be made to identify the individuals listed in the roster records in the ByLock findings and evaluation report, investigative efforts should be made to determine whether these individuals are also accused of the same offence and whether they have made any statements concerning the accused, and, if so, their case files should be obtained and examined, and these individuals should also be summoned and heard as witnesses during the hearing. Furthermore, a search should be conducted through the UYAP data system to determine whether there are any other witness or confessor statements concerning the accused person. If such statements exist, certified copies of the relevant information and documents should be added to the file, and if necessary, the individuals in question should also be heard as witnesses. In accordance with Article 217 of the Law no. 5271, the accused person and his defence counsel should be invited to submit their observations, and a decision should be issued based on the outcome of the above-mentioned inquiries. However, in the present case, the judgment was delivered on the basis of an incomplete investigation...”*

76. In the decision in question, the Court of Cassation first emphasised the necessity of obtaining the ByLock findings and evaluation report. At this point, the authorities would like to draw attention to a significant issue: Although the ByLock findings and evaluation report is technically considered conclusive evidence establishing that the accused person is a ByLock user, the Court of Cassation, while acknowledging the necessity of submitting such a report, does not consider it sufficient in itself. The Court of Cassation also highlights the requirement for a more comprehensive assessment of the evidence. In this regard, it underlines the necessity of identification of the individuals listed in the roster records, i.e. those with whom the accused person is alleged to have communicated via ByLock. Furthermore, it considers it necessary to investigate whether these individuals are also accused of the same offence and whether they have made any statements concerning the accused person in the context of other files, and, if so, to obtain and examine those files. In addition, the Court of Cassation

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underlines that these individuals should be summoned and heard as witnesses at the hearing and that the other evidence must also be thoroughly examined.

77. This approach demonstrates that the Court of Cassation adheres to a principle of meticulous and multi-faceted examination in the assessment of evidence. In doing so, it prevents the accused person's connection to ByLock from being inferred solely on the basis of technical data and ensures that the accusation is based on a broader and more substantiated evidentiary framework.

78. On 23 December 2024 the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in its quashing decision on the cassation appeal filed by the accused, who had been found to be a ByLock user, noted as follows (see Annex 31):

*“...In cases where it is established beyond any doubt through technical data that the accused person, who does not admit to being a ByLock user, indeed used the ByLock application, then such evidence becomes decisive in proving the offence in question. Accordingly, a detailed ByLock findings and evaluation report should be obtained from the relevant authorities, efforts should be made to identify the individuals whose names appear in the list of “individuals added” and “individuals adding” in the roster records in the ByLock findings and evaluation report, investigative efforts should be made to determine whether these individuals are also accused of the same offence and whether they have made any statements concerning the accused person, and, if so, their case files should be obtained and examined, and these individuals should also be summoned and heard as witnesses during the hearing. In accordance with Article 217 of the Law no. 5271, the accused person and his defence counsel should be invited to submit their observations, and a decision should be issued based on the outcome of the above-mentioned inquiries. However, in the present case, the judgment was delivered on the basis of an incomplete investigation...”*

79. Similarly, the Court of Cassation emphasised that the Bylock finding and evaluation report should be obtained, the identities of the persons named in the roster records in the adder and added list should be determined and their statements should be taken and other evidence should be collected, and quashed the decision due to deficiencies in the investigation.

80. On 12 December 2024 the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in its quashing decision on the cassation appeal filed by the accused, who had been found to be a ByLock user, noted as follows (see Annex 32):

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*“...Although having regard to the fact that since the ByLock communication system is a network which is designed for the use of the members of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation and is used exclusively by certain members of this terrorist organisation, the determination, on the basis of technical data which would lead to a definite conclusion without any suspicion, that the relevant person has become a part of this network in line with the organisational instruction and used it for confidential communication will undoubtedly constitute evidence demonstrating the person’s relation with the organisation, whether the accused is a ByLock user is decisive in terms of the nature of the imputed offence; delivering a written decision after an inadequate inquiry ... [has been found unlawful] because the detailed Bylock finding and evaluation report, which was understood to have been included in the file at the appeal stage and which stated that the accused is a ByLock user, should have been read to the accused and his lawyer at a hearing in accordance with Article 217 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and their comments should have been asked, and that a decision should have been delivered after the issue of whether there was an investigation or prosecution against the persons appearing in the ByLock findings and evaluation report as the persons who added, were added and with whom he was in contact was inquired, and the statements taken during the stages in connection with the accused, if any, were added to the file and their statements were taken as witnesses...”*

81. In this decision, the Court of Cassation emphasised that the ByLock findings and evaluation report should have been read to the accused and his lawyer at the hearing and their comments should have been asked. It also stated that the issue of whether there was an investigation or prosecution against the persons appearing in the ByLock findings and evaluation report as the persons who added, were added and with whom he was in contact should have been inquired. It noted that their statements in connection with the accused, if any, should have been added to the file and their statements should have been taken as witnesses.

82. On 27 February 2024 the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in its quashing decision on the cassation appeal filed by the accused, who had been found to be a ByLock user, noted as follows (see Annex 33):

*“...There is no doubt that, where it is established beyond any doubt by conclusive technical data that an individual is included in the said network by the organisation’s instruction and it is used as a communication tool in order to ensure confidentiality, this will be an evidence indicating the individual’s relation to the organisation on the*

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*ground that the ByLock communication system was developed in order to be used by the members of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation and has been used exclusively by certain members of that criminal organisation. It has been observed, however, that the accused person's statement to the effect that "he had downloaded the ByLock software on the recommendation of a customer named Mutlu and that he had corresponded on it only to inform his customers about the special offers in his store, that he had not participated in any organisational activities and that he had no connection with the organisation" as well as the content of the correspondence in the ByLock findings and evaluation report were similar to what he stated in his defence submissions.*

*In the context of verifying the accused person's defence submissions, an inquiry should have been made as to whether there was any investigation or prosecution against any of the persons who appeared in the ByLock findings and evaluation report as the people who added him, those whom he added and those with whom he was in contact on the application and, if any, their statements taken over the course of the criminal proceedings against them, in so far as they concerned the accused, should have been brought into the case file and witness testimonies should have been heard from them. In addition, it should have been ascertained whether there were any witness or confessor statements about the accused by conducting a query on the UYAP (National Judicial Network) data pool; if any, certified copies of the relevant information and documents should have been brought into the case file and read out to the accused and his defence counsel at the hearing in accordance with Article 217 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and if necessary, the relevant persons should have been heard as witnesses before the legal status of the accused was assessed and decided on. For these reasons, the impugned ruling, which was rendered as a result of inadequate inquiry, has been found to be in contravention of the law."*

83. In its decision above, the Court of Cassation quashed the conviction of the accused, who was undoubtedly a Bylock user but who stated that he had no connection with the organisation. The Court of Cassation indicated that the determination, on the basis of technical data which would lead to a definite conclusion without any suspicion, that the relevant person became a part of this network in line with the organisational instruction and used it for confidential communication, would undoubtedly constitute evidence demonstrating the person's relation with the organisation. However, in the present case, the Court of Cassation quashed the decision on the grounds that it could not be

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established that the relevant person became a part of this network in line with the organisational instruction and used it for confidential communication and that further inquiry was therefore required.

84. On 25 January 2024 the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in its quashing decision on the cassation appeal filed by the accused, who had been found to be a ByLock user, noted as follows (see Annex 34):

*“...in the trial held as a result of the investigation initiated against the accused on the charge of using the ByLock communication system, which was found to be used by the FETÖ/PDY organisation for the purpose of organisational communication, it was established within the scope of the case file that [the accused] had been included in this network upon the instruction of the organisation and he had used it for communication purposes to ensure confidentiality, since ByLock is a network created for the use of members of the armed terrorist organisation and used exclusively by certain members of a criminal organisation, according to the ByLock findings and evaluation report and message contents which were used as grounds for conviction. However, considering that the first log date of the accused, who was born in 1997, was 9 November 2015 and that he was 18 or -19 years old and a high school student on the last contact date in February 2016, that no organisational connection and activity of the accused after the aforementioned date could be detected, and that the correspondence in the ByLock content was not sufficient to show that the accused had entered the hierarchy of the organisation, it has been understood that the accused, given his age, would not have been in a position to know that the structure with which he was in a relationship was an armed terrorist organisation in terms of its nature at that time and therefore the criminal intent element of the offence of being a member of an armed terrorist organisation would not have materialised in respect of the accused. For these reasons, the fact that the impugned conviction ruling was rendered in respect of the accused, instead of an acquittal pursuant to Article 30 § 1 of the Turkish Criminal Code and Article 223 § 2 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has been found to be in contravention of the law.”*

85. In this judgment, the Court of Cassation did not consider the existence of ByLock alone sufficient for the conviction of the accused. The Court of Cassation examined whether there was criminal intent and assessed the accused’s situation in terms of the criteria of continuity, diversity and intensity of his activities. As a result, it concluded that the accused had no criminal intent and should be acquitted. Therefore, there is currently no automatic presumption of guilt based on ByLock use in the domestic law. As is seen,

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all constituent elements of the offence and the criteria determined by the case-law are examined in detail and a decision is delivered accordingly.

86. On 9 January 2024 the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in its quashing decision on the cassation appeal filed by the accused, who had been found to be a ByLock user, noted as follows (see Annex 35):

*“...There is no doubt that, where it is established beyond any doubt by conclusive technical data that an individual is included in the said network by the organisation’s instruction and it is used as a communication tool in order to ensure confidentiality, this will be an evidence indicating the individual’s relation to the organisation on the ground that the ByLock communication system was developed in order to be used by the members of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation and has been used exclusively by certain members of that criminal organisation. It has been observed, however, that the accused person denied being a ByLock user in his defence submissions. In the context of verifying the accused person’s defence submissions, an inquiry should have been made as to whether there was any investigation or prosecution against any of the persons who appeared in the ByLock findings and evaluation report as the people who added him, those whom he added and those with whom he was in contact on the application and, if any, their statements taken over the course of the criminal proceedings against them, in so far as they concerned the accused, should have been brought into the case file and witness testimonies should have been heard from them; and only thereafter a ruling should have been rendered, in consideration of the results of these steps. **For these reasons, the impugned ruling, which was rendered as a result of inadequate inquiry, ... has been found to be in contravention of the law.**”*

87. As is seen, the Court of Cassation considers the ByLock findings and evaluation report necessary to check the accused’s defence. The Court of Cassation further finds it necessary to inquiry other issues, *inter alia*, those adduced by the defendants to exculpate themselves in addition to the ByLock findings and evaluation report, as seen in the sample judgments. Otherwise, the Court of Cassation would quash the judgment delivered by the first instance court by remitting the case file. In this respect, the authorities are of the opinion that the current practice of the Court of Cassation and the domestic courts is in conformity with the case-law of the Court.

88. In the decision dated 6 March 2024, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation held that if it is found without any doubt and based on unquestionable technical data that a person is registered to the ByLock network upon the instruction of the

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organisation and that it is used for communication purposes in order to ensure confidentiality, it shall be considered unquestionable evidence that indicates the person's affiliation with the organisation. However, the Court of Cassation went on to add that the defence submission of an accused who stated that he/she was not a user of ByLock should be reviewed. Therefore, the Court of Cassation quashed the decision on the grounds that, according to Article 217 of the CCP, the ByLock findings and evaluation reports that were understood to have arrived at the stage of appeal as well as the identification reports and records of statements of the witnesses who made statements regarding the accused should have been read out and discussed during the hearing, and the legal status of the accused should have been determined and evaluated after duly hearing the said persons in the capacity of witness (see Annex 36).

89. Consistently, on 28 March 2024, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation quashed the lower court's judgment on the grounds that, according to Article 217 of the Law no. 5271, the ByLock findings and evaluation reports that were understood to have arrived at the stage of appeal should have been read out to the accused and his/her defence counsel during the hearing and they should have been asked if they had anything to state; it should have been inquired whether there was any investigation or prosecution against any of the persons who appeared in the ByLock findings and evaluation report as the people who added him, those whom he added and those with whom he was in contact; if so, the statements at all stages should have been included in the file; and the legal status of the accused should have been determined and evaluated after hearing the said persons in the capacity of witness (see Annex 37).

90. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation emphasised the importance of ByLock evidence in its decision dated 5 March 2024. It stated that the detailed ByLock findings and evaluation report should have been brought by the relevant units, the identification details of the persons whose names were included in the roster records, if any, should have been detected and whether they were accused of this offence and whether they had made statements regarding the accused in the file should have been inquired, files, if any, should have been obtained and reviewed, and they should have been summoned to a hearing and their statements heard in the capacity of witness. Furthermore, the Court of Cassation stated that it should have been inquired whether there were any statements or information regarding the applicant in the UYAP database; if so, these persons should have been duly heard in the capacity of witness, the accused and his/her defence counsel should have been asked if they had anything to state, and a



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decision should have been rendered accordingly. For these reasons, it quashed the decision of the Regional Court of Appeal (see Annex 38).

91. Likewise, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation stressed the significance of the ByLock evidence in its decision dated 7 February 2024 where it quashed the conviction delivered by the first instance court. In its decision, the Court of Cassation stressed that it should have been inquired whether there was any investigation or prosecution against any of the persons who appeared in the ByLock findings and evaluation report present in the file as the people who added him, those whom he added and those with whom he was in contact; if so, the statements regarding the accused at all stages should have been included in the file, and the legal status of the accused should have been evaluated after hearing the said persons in the capacity of witness (see Annex 39).
92. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation emphasised the importance of ByLock evidence included in the file but quashed the accused's conviction in its decision dated 19 February 2024. In its decision, the Court of Cassation stressed that, along with other matters, the relevant units should have been asked at which stage the USERID detection studies were and requested once more the detailed ByLock findings and evaluation report, the various evidence obtained should have been read out to the accused and his defence counsel during the hearing according to Article 217 of the Law no. 5271 and they should have been asked if they had anything to state and, if necessary, the persons who made statements should have been heard in the capacity of witness, and a decision should have been made based on the conclusion; however, the said judgment was delivered on the basis of inadequate inquiry and examination and therefore it was contrary to the law (see Annex 40).
93. Lastly, in a decision dated 13 June 2024, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation stressed that, after reading out the ByLock findings and evaluation report to the accused and his defence counsel during the hearing and asking if they had anything to state, the relevant units should have inquired whether there was any investigation or prosecution against any of the persons who appeared in the ByLock findings and evaluation report as the people who added him, those whom he added and those with whom he was in contact; if so, the statements regarding the accused at all stages should have been included in the file, and the legal status of the accused should have been evaluated after hearing the said persons in the capacity of witness (see Annex 41).

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94. Thus, the Court of Cassation ensured a judicial practice where all the necessary elements of criminal intent, continuity, diversity, intensity of the accused's activities and hierarchical link for the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation are inquired. For more sample decisions see Annexes 42-56.

### **iii) Judgments of the Constitutional Court**

95. The role of ByLock evidence in determining membership of a terrorist organisation was addressed many times by the Constitutional Court. As can be seen in the following sample judgments, the Constitutional Court adopted a judicial practice in compliance with the European Court's findings.

96. For example, in the judgment of Ferhat Kara<sup>3</sup>, the Plenary of the Constitutional Court indicated as follows: *"In the judicial proceedings, not the downloading of the impugned application to the device, but the signing up to it and its use for organisational purposes were taken into consideration. As a matter of fact, according to the findings of the judicial authorities, no investigation was conducted against individuals only for having downloaded the ByLock application to their devices. Yet, in case of any allegation to the contrary, it is observed that the judicial authorities conducted inquiries in this respect."* (Ferhat Kara no. 2018/15231, 4 June 2020, paragraph 158).

97. In its *Nagehan Özgül*<sup>4</sup> decision, the Constitutional Court made the following assessments regarding the alleged violation of the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings (*Nagehan Özgül*, no. 2018/38165, 15 June 2022, §§ 43-47):

*"43. In the present case, the evidence taken as basis to convict the applicant for the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation includes her being a ByLock user and being employed at institutions that were shut down due to their affiliation with the organisation. As there was no evaluation in the reasoned judgment regarding the Bank Asya account activities that were obtained during the investigation stage, it does not seem possible to state that these account activities occurred upon the instruction of the organisation's leader. In its upholding decision the Court of Cassation stated that rendering a decision without waiting for the ByLock findings and evaluation report did not affect the outcome; however, it did not provide any explanations as to what the other pieces of evidence considered sufficient for conviction were and the exclusion of the finding of ByLock usage from its evaluations in their entirety. Therefore, there is no doubt as to the fact that the decisive evidence, among others, was the data concerning*

<sup>3</sup> <https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2018/15231>

<sup>4</sup> <https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2018/38165>

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*the alleged use of ByLock that was taken as basis for her conviction for the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation. At all stages of the proceedings, the applicant objected to her alleged use of ByLock and stated that the GSM line taken as basis for ByLock findings belonged to her but she neither installed nor used the application.*

*44. In its Ferhat Kara ([Plenary], no. 2018/15231, 4 June 2020) decision, the Constitutional Court considered that a person's use of the encrypted communication network -used for the purposes of ensuring confidentiality in organisational communication only by FETÖ/PDY members due to its structure, usage and technical features- being taken as basis for the conviction of membership of a terrorist organisation does not render ineffective the procedural safeguards and is not clearly an arbitrary practice. It held that the allegations regarding the use of ByLock evidence as the sole or decisive evidence for the conviction amount to ordinary legal-remedy complaints by nature (Ferhat Kara, § 161). In the practice of the Court of Cassation, finding without any doubt and based on unquestionable technical data that a person is registered to the ByLock network upon the instruction of the organisation and that it is used for communication purposes in order to ensure confidentiality is considered evidence that indicates the person's affiliation with the organisation. **Accordingly, where the conviction judgment for the offence of membership of an organisation is based on the use of ByLock, the ByLock Findings and Evaluations Report indicating the User-ID, password and similar elements must be added to the file. In case the said report cannot be obtained, a decision must be delivered upon a technical report to be obtained from an expert on whether the accused person used the ByLock application over the relevant line after the comparison of the HIS(CGNAT) records obtained from the BTK and HTS results in the case file by means of matching them with the operator's records. Also, it should be stated according to the practice of the Court of Cassation that the ByLock CCPO Query Report issued by law enforcement units was not sufficient to determine with unquestionable technical data that the accused who refused to accept he/she is a ByLock user actually used the ByLock application.***

*45. The Court delivered the conviction judgment on the grounds that the applicant was a part of the hierarchic structure of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation and had organic links to this organisation, based on the finding that he used this application according to the results of the ByLock query, as the ByLock communication application was solely used by FETÖ/PDY members. However, within the scope of the practice of the Court of Cassation, it was not explained why the ByLock query results report, which*

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*is considered insufficient by itself for the unquestionable determination of ByLock use with technical data, is considered a technical data/evidence capable of leading to a definite conclusion under the circumstances of the present case. In other words, the link between the contents of the query results issued by law enforcement units and the act imputed to the applicant was not demonstrated clearly. Moreover, the reasoned judgment did not contain any explanations as to whether the Bank Asya account activities were ordinary and their effect on the conclusion reached. The reason why being employed at institutions that were shut down due to their affiliation with the organisation is considered organisational activity was not evaluated either.*

*47. In the present case, it can be seen in the conviction judgment the Court delivered for the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation that it did not separately and clearly discuss some of the allegations that directly affect the result of the case against the applicant. **In this regard, the Court failed to sufficiently demonstrate, by means of technical data in accordance with the practice of the Court of Cassation, the fact of ByLock usage - which is accepted as evidence, which shows that the applicant voluntarily and knowingly became a part of the hierarchical structure of FETÖ/PDY, and which involves continuity, diversity and intensity – since such a finding is solely based on query results.** Furthermore, it was seen that no evaluation was made as to whether the Bank Asya account activities were ordinary and whether they were carried out upon the instruction of the leader of the organisation for the purpose of aiding it. This matter led the proceedings as a whole not to be fair.”*

98. In its *Sabri Yılmaz*<sup>5</sup> decision (no. 2018/11960, 30 March 2022) the Constitutional Court made the following assessments regarding the alleged violation of the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings (*Sabri Yılmaz*, no. 2018/11960, 30 March 2022, § 49):

*... the applicant’s request for obtaining ByLock contents was rejected. The HIS(CGNAT) records were not obtained from the BTK and a technical report was not obtained from an expert on whether the accused person used the ByLock application over the relevant line after the comparison of those records and HTS results. The conviction judgment was rendered solely based on the data on the ByLock Query Results Report. It is the trial court, as a rule, which has the power to evaluate the evidence regarding a certain case and decide whether the evidence shown is related to the case. Moreover, both at*

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<sup>5</sup> <https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2018/11960>

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*this same stage and within this context, it is not the duty of the Constitutional Court to find a person guilty or innocent or determine a lighter or heavier punishment. The conclusion to be reached by the Constitutional Court in this context does not mean that the applicant will definitely be acquitted or convicted. It is natural that a decision will be rendered based on the result of the examination and evaluation to be performed by means of the instance court eliminating the shortcomings stated here (Ruhşen Mahmutoglu, § 67). Moreover, the applicant was considerably disadvantaged in terms of benefiting from procedural opportunities before the prosecution as a result of the instance court in the present case solely taking as basis the Query Results Report that was submitted to the file by the prosecution and the law enforcement units as to the existence of the facts put forward as reason for conviction, and the instance court failing to conduct a necessary and sufficient examination/evaluation regarding the evidence submitted by the applicant for questioning the authenticity and credibility of these reports. It is not possible for the applicant to prove his allegations by his own means. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the method adopted by the court did not comply with the requirements of the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings and did not involve guarantees protecting the applicant's benefits. This situation resulted in proceedings being unfair as a whole.*

99. As is seen, the Constitutional Court adopted a judicial practice in line with the principles set forth by the European Court.

**B. Conclusion regarding Violation of Article 7**

100. As can be seen in the sample judicial decisions, with regards to the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation, the judicial authorities examine whether the accused's affiliation with the organisation surpassed having sympathies towards it and led him/her to have a position within its hierarchy and whether this affiliation involved diversity, continuity and intensity that warrants conviction for the offence of membership of the organisation, as well as the criminal intent, within the framework of the criteria determined with the comprehensive case-law of the Court of Cassation. It can be seen from many other similar decisions, the samples of which have been provided above, that these criteria are being implemented in a consistent manner. For example, in its judgment of 26 December 2024 (see §§ 70-72 above), the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment convicting the accused person, stating that it could not be established that the accused person had had an organic link with the organisation and had taken part within the hierarchical structure as a result of the

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examination made in respect of him who was undoubtedly a user of ByLock. Again, as seen in other sample judgments, the judgments in respect of the accused persons who were found established to be ByLock users were quashed on the grounds that further investigations should be carried out to determine whether the elements of the offence were constituted in the present case within the framework of the criteria established by the case-law of the Court of Cassation. These sample judgments demonstrate that it is not possible to state that there is an established judicial practice in which being a ByLock user is accepted as a presumption leading to almost strict liability and directly applied as a reason for punishment. The domestic courts assess being a ByLock user as a piece of evidence rather than conclusive proof of guilt, but reach a conclusion by making an evaluation as to the elements of the offence in question such as hierarchical link, criminal intent, diversity, continuity and intensity in the accused person's acts.

101. Thus, the authorities consider that the current judicial practice is in compliance with the Court's findings set out in the judgement at hand. Accordingly, the authorities take the view that no further general measure is necessary within the context of Article 7 of the Convention.

### **C. Violation of Article 6 of the Convention**

102. The Court noted that essence of the applicant's complaint within the meaning of Article 6 is based on allegations as to domestic courts' use of the data concerning his alleged use of ByLock as a decisive factor without duly addressing the applicant's concerns.

103. Within this scope, the Court found that its task under Article 6 § 1 was rather to assess the fairness of the proceedings as a whole, taking into account the specific nature and circumstances of the case, including the way in which the evidence was taken and used, and the manner in which any objections concerning the evidence were dealt with (see *Yalçınkaya*, cited above, § 310)

104. Before proceeding with this examination, the Court wished to clarify whether the specific nature of the evidence at issue, that is encrypted electronic data stored at the server of an Internet-based communication application, requires it to adapt the application of the relevant guarantees under Article 6 § 1 in any way (see, *ibid*, § 311).

105. The Court acknowledged that electronic evidence has become ubiquitous in criminal trials in view of the increased digitalisation of all aspects of life. It noted more pertinently, and without prejudice to its subsequent examination in the present case, that recourse to electronic evidence attesting that an individual is using an encrypted

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messaging system which had been specially designed for and used exclusively by a criminal organisation in the internal communications of that organisation, can be very important in the fight against organised crime. It also noted that electronic evidence differs in many respects from traditional forms of evidence, including as regards its nature and the special technologies required for its collection, securing, processing and analysis. The Court also reiterated that the use of untested electronic evidence in criminal proceedings may involve particular difficulties for the judiciary as the nature of the procedure and technology applied to the collection of such evidence is complex and may therefore diminish the ability of national judges to establish its authenticity, accuracy and integrity. Moreover, the handling of electronic evidence, particularly where it concerns data that are encrypted and/or vast in volume or scope, may present the law enforcement and judicial authorities with serious practical and procedural challenges at both the investigation and trial stages (see, *ibid*, § 312).

106. The Court pointed out that electronic or other data collected by intelligence services may be increasingly resorted to in criminal proceedings as direct or indirect evidence. Referring to the Venice Commission, the Court stressed that in order to anticipate, prevent or protect itself against threats to its national security, a State needs effective intelligence and security services and that intelligence constitutes one of the main weapons the State has in the struggle against terrorism. The Court also notes that it is a natural consequence of the forms taken by present-day terrorism that governments resort to cutting-edge technologies in pre-empting such attacks (see, *ibid*, § 315).

107. The Court noted that issues such as the weight attached by the national courts to particular items of evidence or to findings or assessments submitted to them for consideration are not for the Court to review (see, *ibid*, § 304). The Court noted that it is not for the Court to pronounce on whether and in what circumstances and format intelligence information may be admitted in criminal proceedings as evidence (see, *ibid*, § 316).

108. The Court considered that, having regard to its limited role in determining the admissibility of a piece of evidence or reviewing its assessment by national courts, it was not necessary, for the purposes of its present examination under Article 6, to determine whether the contested evidence had been actually obtained lawfully in terms of domestic law and had been admissible, or whether the domestic courts had made any substantive errors in their assessment of the relevant evidence. The Court stressed that its task under Article 6 § 1 is rather to assess the fairness of the proceedings as a whole,

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taking into account the specific nature and circumstances of the case, including the way in which the evidence was taken and used, and the manner in which any objections concerning the evidence were dealt with (see, *ibid*, § 310).

109. The Court noted that there were no objective indications before it to doubt that the MİT or other public authorities had acted in good faith in relation to the ByLock data (see, *ibid*, § 317).

110. The Court did not accept the objections raised by the applicant concerning the lawfulness of CGNAT data and HTS records (see, *ibid*, §§ 320-322). The Court also noted that the applicant had available to him all the ByLock reports relied on by the domestic courts in the criminal proceedings, and that the accuracy of the ByLock data pertaining to him had been verified on the basis of data obtained from other sources. The Court further noted that a technical report produced in 2020 explained that it was not possible to sort the raw data on a user ID basis without first processing them (see, *ibid*, § 326).

111. While the Court does not ignore the significance of these factors, it considers that they are not determinative of the question whether the applicant's defence rights vis-à-vis the ByLock evidence were duly respected in the present case (see, *ibid*, § 326). In this regard, the Court stated that it would concentrate on the applicant's ability to effectively challenge ByLock evidence in proceedings (see, *ibid*, § 311). The Court summarised the complaints which it examined in turn as follows (see, *ibid*, § 325):

*“The applicant mainly complained that he had been unable to properly challenge the ByLock evidence in his regard as the data collected by the MİT from the ByLock server had not been shared with him or submitted to independent examination in accordance with the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings, and as required under Article 134 § 4 of the CCP.”*

112. **In its assessment as to Article 6, the Court firstly** addressed non-disclosure of the relevant Bylock data to the applicant.

113. As regards this issue, the Court emphasised that the entitlement to disclosure of evidence is not an absolute right. The Court stressed that there may be a variety of reasons which may require the withholding of evidence from the defence, including concerns over national security or the preservation of the fundamental rights of others (see, *ibid*, § 329).

114. The Court continued its explanations concerning the matter as follows:



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*“Moreover, where the evidence in the hands of the prosecution relates to a large mass of electronic information, it may not be possible, or even necessary, to disclose that information to the defence in its entirety. The applicant’s right to disclosure must not be confused with a right of access to all that material. The Court is accordingly able to accept that there may have been legitimate reasons for not sharing the raw data with the applicant in the present case. It is further reiterated that in cases where evidence has been withheld from the defence on public interest grounds, it is not the role of this Court to decide whether or not such non-disclosure was strictly necessary since, as a general rule, it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them (see, *ibid*, § 329).”*

115. As regards the present case the Court noted firstly that according to the information in the case file, the reasons advanced by the Government before the Court to justify the non-disclosure of the relevant data to the applicant had never been actually adverted to in the domestic courts’ judgments; so the applicant’s request simply had gone unanswered. The Court stressed that its task is rather to examine whether any prejudice sustained by the applicant on account of the non-disclosure of the relevant ByLock data was counterbalanced by adequate procedural safeguards and whether he was given a proper opportunity to prepare his defence, as required by Article 6 of the Convention (see, *ibid*, § 330).

116. Accordingly, while the Court acknowledges that it is in no position to determine whether, in what form and to what extent the relevant data should have been shared with the applicant, it cannot but note that the applicant was given no explanation by the domestic courts as to why, and upon whose decision, the raw data – particularly to the extent that they concerned him specifically – were kept from him (see, *ibid*, § 331). Indeed, the Court did not criticise non-delivery of raw data to the applicant, it criticised the fact that the domestic courts had remained inactive without providing a reasoning concerning this request of the applicant.

117. The Government would like to point out that the reason why raw data was not shared with the applicant is obvious according to the expert report<sup>6</sup> dated 2 April 2020 which was examined by the Court within the context of the judgment of *Yalçınkaya*. In this respect, it was explained that it was not possible to sort the raw data on a user ID basis without first processing them (see, *ibid*, § 121). However, the Court noted that the

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<sup>6</sup> “Analysis Report on Intra-Organisational Communication Application” prepared by the Anti-Smuggling and Organised Crime Department

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applicant had been given no explanation by the domestic courts as to why the raw data had been kept from him. Accordingly, it flows from the judgment that failure to provide sufficient reasoning as to this request was one of the reasons for the violation of Article 6.

118. The authorities would like to stress that the reasonable and substantiated requests related to the case file do not remain unaddressed. The trial courts provide necessary explanations, and thereby, it is ensured that the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings are duly applied. Where the trial authorities carry out a deficient assessment, the problem may be eliminated by means of objection remedies provided for in the domestic law, and a possible violation is prevented within the context of Article 6 of the Convention. The sample court decisions below indicate that there is an established practice on this matter.

119. Within this scope, as regards the alleged violation of the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings, the Constitutional Court made the following assessments in the decision of *Oğuzhan Aksoy*<sup>7</sup> (*Oğuzhan Aksoy*, no. 2018/37293, 13 September 2022, § 68-69):

*As a result, the Court did not discuss in its reasoned decision the objections raised in terms of the compliance of the CGNAT records -evidence- with the acceptance that the applicant had been included in the ByLock communication system with the instruction of the organisation and that this program had been used for communication purposes in order to ensure confidentiality, and in which aspect it did not rely on the applicant's defence submissions at the stages; **the Court and the Chamber did not provide the applicant with the opportunity to examine these records in their entirety and to effectively challenge their content.** In principle, it is for the trial court to assess the available evidence in a given case and to decide whether the evidence adduced relates to the case. Moreover, both at this stage and in this context, it is not the duty of the Constitutional Court to decide on guilty or innocence or to determine a slighter or heavier sentence, nor does the conclusion to be reached by the Constitutional Court here mean that the applicant must be acquitted or convicted. A decision will be rendered according to the result of the examination and evaluation to be made by eliminating the deficiencies mentioned here by the first instance court.*

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<sup>7</sup> <https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2018/37293>

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*... It is not possible for the applicant to prove his allegations with his own means. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the method adopted by the Court and Chamber did not comply with the requirements of the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings and did not involve guarantees protecting the applicant's benefits. This situation resulted in the proceedings being unfair as a whole.*

120. **Secondly**, the Court noted that recalling once again the critical importance of the raw ByLock data to the applicant's case, the domestic courts' failure to respond to his request for such independent examination – even if only to explain why such independent examination was not deemed necessary – was problematic (see *Yalçınkaya*, cited above, §§ 332-333). The point considered as problematic by the Court is the fact that the request for independent examination was remained unaddressed (see, *ibid*, § 326). On the other hand, the Court referred to the expert report and noted that it was not possible to sort the raw data on a user ID basis without first processing them (see, *ibid*, § 121).

121. In summary, the Court found that the domestic courts had failed to respond to the applicant's request for an expert examination without providing sufficient reasoning. On this basis, the Government is of the opinion that the underlying reason for the violation at hand is the domestic courts' failure to submit sufficient reasoning in their practice. Therefore, the relevant general measures are those aiming to improve judicial practice, such as awareness raising activities, training and guidance from the higher courts. Here, the authorities would like to provide information on the current judicial practice (*for general measures concerning awareness raising and training activities, see below*).

122. For instance, the Constitutional Court noted the following in the application of *Esra Saraç Arslan*<sup>8</sup> in which it held that the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings had been violated due to dismissal of the request for performance of expert examination on the data concerning ByLock evidence (*Esra Saraç Arslan*, no. 2019/10514, 28 December 2022, §§ 57-59):

*In her defence submissions at investigation and trial stages, the applicant objected to the allegation that she was a user of ByLock and stated that the records of ByLock Inquiry Result and CGNAT records submitted in the case file were not accurate. The applicant stated during her questioning before the Magistrate Judgeship that she had*

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<sup>8</sup> <https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2019/10514>

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*downloaded the program but not used it. At the second hearing of the proceedings, the applicant's defence counsel requested that the Police Department be asked whether the findings of connection list concerning ByLock were possible and that an expert examination be carried out. The court dismissed the request in view of the current stage of the proceedings and existing ByLock findings, and it announced the conviction judgment at the next hearing.*

*In the present case, the request of the applicant for performance of expert examination on technical data concerning ByLock was dismissed, and a conviction judgment was issued in view of the ByLock query result report and CGNAT records. The reasoned decision did not provide an explanation as to the fact that CGNAT records had been examined specifically in relation to the accused person and the present incident. It was also observed that the statement given before the Magistrate Judgeship, which the Court of Cassation took as a basis in the upholding decision, was related to the acknowledgement that the program had been downloaded from the application store. However, the Court of Cassation accepted as evidence not downloading of ByLock program but its use for organisational purposes; and the Constitutional Court did not see any problem with respect to this finding within the context of the examination made in terms of the Constitution.*

*As a result, the fact that the domestic court took into account only the query result report and CGNAT records submitted by the Police Department in the case file as regards the existence of facts, which the domestic court showed as a basis of the conviction, and that the expert examination requested by the applicant detained pending trial for the establishment of the accuracy and reliability of these reports and records was dismissed without performing a sufficient examination/assessment put the applicant in a disadvantaged position vis a vis prosecution authority in terms of benefiting from procedural opportunities. It was not possible for the applicant to prove her allegations with her own means. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the method adopted by the court did not comply with the requirements of the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings and did not involve guarantees protecting the applicant's benefits. This situation resulted in the proceedings being unfair as a whole.*

123. By the same token, the Constitutional Court noted the following in the application of *Soner Onursal*<sup>9</sup> in which it held that the principles of equality of arms and adversarial

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<sup>9</sup> <https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2019/42246>

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proceedings had been violated due to dismissal of the request for performance of expert examination on the data concerning ByLock evidence (*Soner Onursal*, no. 2019/42246, 16 March 2023, §§ 31-33):

*In the present case, in his defence submissions at investigation and trial stages, the applicant objected to the allegation that he was a user of ByLock and stated that the records of ByLock Inquiry Result and CGNAT records submitted in the case file were not accurate. At the stage of preparation for hearing, the applicant's defence counsel requested in writing the performance of an expert examination on ByLock data and the obtaining of a report. The court continued to hear the case without making an assessment concerning this request and issued a conviction judgment. The applicant's objections that a ruling had been issued without performing an expert examination on ByLock data were not addressed in the decisions of the Regional Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation.*

*As a result, the applicant's request to obtain a technical report from an expert as to whether he was the person using ByLock on the specified line by comparing the CGNAT and HTS records was not accepted and conviction was ordered. Moreover, the fact that the Court took into account only the ByLock query result report and CGNAT records as regards the existence of facts, which the domestic court showed as a basis of the conviction, and that **the failure to carry out a sufficient examination/assessment as regards the evidence indicated by the applicant detained pending trial for the establishment of the accuracy and reliability of these records put the applicant in a disadvantaged position vis a vis prosecution authority in terms of benefiting from procedural opportunities**. It was not possible for the applicant to prove his allegations with his own opportunities. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the method adopted by the court did not comply with the requirements of the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings and did not involve guarantees protecting the applicant's benefits. This situation resulted in the proceedings being unfair as a whole. For the explained reasons, it must be held that there were violations of the right to equality of arms and adversarial proceedings under the scope of the right to a fair trial safeguarded by Article 36 of the Constitution.*

124. In its judgments, the Constitutional Court, in summary, found a violation on the ground that the rejection of the request for an expert examination without an adequate assessment/evaluation put the accused person in a significantly disadvantageous position and remitted the files to the courts of instance for retrial. As is seen, the findings

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in the Constitutional Court's judgments coincide exactly with the Court's approach to the issue.

125. The authorities would also like to point out that the Constitutional Court's decision in the case of *Sabri Yılmaz* mentioned above (*see, paragraph 98 above*), in which the Constitutional Court ruled that the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings had been violated, contains similar assessments.

126. **The Court, thirdly, highlighted** the fact that a number of other arguments raised by the applicant to point out his concerns regarding the reliability of the ByLock evidence were similarly left unanswered by the domestic courts. The Court noted that the national courts did not examine the arguments that MİT was not authorised to collect data to be used as evidence during criminal proceedings and that the domestic court's decision of 9 December 2016 cannot render as retrospectively 'lawful' and reliable the evidence collected in such manner (*see Yalçınkaya*, cited above, § 334).

127. In response to the applicant's above argument, the Court indicated that it was not for the Court to pronounce on whether and in what circumstances and format intelligence information may be admitted in criminal proceedings as evidence. Moreover, the Court noted the findings of the Venice Commission<sup>10</sup> on the issue of whether intelligence services have the authority to collect evidence. As indicated by the Venice Commission, "in order to anticipate, prevent or protect itself against threats to its national security, a State needs effective intelligence and security services" and that intelligence constitutes "one of the main weapons the State has in the struggle against terrorism". The Court also notes that it is a natural consequence of the forms taken by present-day terrorism that governments resort to cutting-edge technologies in pre-empting such attacks (*see, ibid*, § 315). It flows from the judgment that the Court did not admit the applicant's argument as to the legality of this evidence.

128. As pointed out by the Court and explained in the Constitutional Court's decision in the case of *Ferhat Kara*, the image of the ByLock raw data, delivered to the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor's Office by the MİT, was obtained, and a copy of it was sent to the KOM for examination, and the other image was secured at the safety deposit office inside a lockbox. These images are secured in lockboxes (*see § 177 and Ferhat Kara*, § 59).

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<sup>10</sup> The Report on the Democratic Oversight of the Security Services adopted by the Venice Commission at its 71<sup>st</sup> Plenary Session (Venice, 1-2 June 2007) (CDL-AD(2007)016-e) and updated at the 102<sup>nd</sup> Plenary Session (Venice, 20-21 March 2015) (CDL-AD(2015)010)

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129. The European Court also noted that there were no objective indications before it to doubt that the MİT or other public authorities had acted in good faith in relation to the ByLock data (see, *ibid*, § 317).
130. Considering all of these assessments made by the Court, what the Court considers to be a problem here is the lack of sufficient reasoning by the national courts in response to the applicant's allegations. The Government would like to provide sample judgments to demonstrate the current judicial practice.
131. The Constitutional Court made the following assessment as to lawfulness of the ByLock evidence in its judgment of *Ferhat Kara* (*Ferhat Kara*, § 136):  
*"Consequently, the delivery of the data concerning the ByLock application, which had been found out during the intelligence efforts conducted in respect of a terrorist organisation aiming to overthrow the constitutional order, to the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor's Office in order to contribute to revealing the material truth during the investigations/proceedings against this organisation did not prima facie involve any unlawfulness. Moreover, there was no finding established by the Court of Cassation or inferior courts to suggest the existence of any unlawfulness in respect of this process. On the contrary, in several of its decisions the Plenary of the Court of Cassation in Criminal Matters reached the conclusion that the manner in which ByLock had been obtained -as a piece of evidence- was in line with the law (see, for one of such decisions, decision no. E.2018/16- 419, K.2018/661 dated 20 December 2018 of the Plenary of the Court of Cassation in Criminal Matters). Therefore, the submission, to the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, of the digital materials concerning the ByLock communication system, which were obtained/found out by the MİT within the scope of its legal powers, as well as of the technical report issued in this respect cannot be considered to constitute a practice involving a manifest error of discretion or manifest arbitrariness."*
132. In conclusion, it appears that the issue here is again the failure to provide sufficient reasoning as to the applicant's arguments. In view of the above, the authorities would like to underline that according to the domestic law, the courts are supposed to provide sufficient reasoning in response to the reasonable requests of the suspects. The Constitutional Court's main approach to the issue demonstrates that the necessary measures have already been implemented to enhance judicial practice and ensure compliance with this requirement.

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133. **Fourthly**, the Court noted that the Ankara Regional Court of Appeal had requested the KOM to provide the content of the exchanges engaged in by the applicant over ByLock, as well as information regarding the individuals that he had communicated with. However, the relevant court had then delivered its judgment without awaiting the submission of those data, which had been eventually included in the file after the applicant's conviction had become final. The applicant's objections regarding the absence of those data had been also dismissed by the Court of Cassation, which had held that the delivery of the appeal judgment without awaiting the submission of the detailed ByLock findings and evaluation report had not affected the outcome. However, the European Court considered that giving the applicant the opportunity to acquaint himself with the decrypted ByLock material in his regard would have constituted an important step in preserving his defence rights (see *Yalçınkaya*, cited above, §§ 335-336).

134. The authorities would like to indicate that as is evident from the sample judicial decisions provided above as to the violation of Article 7, the judicial authorities consider it necessary to obtain the ByLock findings and evaluation report. As noted by the Court (see, *ibid*, § 107), the findings and evaluation report contains all the data available and recoverable in the ByLock raw data of the person concerned. Therefore, in addition to the technical data proving that the person was a ByLock user, this report also contains the content of the conversations and information on the persons who were registered in the contact list and with whom the person was in contact. In this respect, adding the findings and evaluation report into the file, making it available for the accused's examination and asking the accused to submit his/her comments on it provides the accused with a possibility to use his/her defence rights. In this context, the sample judicial decisions provided below also demonstrate that there is no systemic problem in practice.

135. In its judgment of 12 December 2024 quashing the accused's conviction, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation made, *inter alia*, the following assessments as grounds for the quash (see Annex 57):

*"Although having regard to the fact that since the ByLock communication system is a network which is designed for the use of the members of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation and is used exclusively by certain members of this terrorist organisation, the determination, on the basis of technical data which would lead to a definite conclusion without any suspicion, that the relevant person has become a part of this*



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*network in line with the organisational instruction and used it for confidential communication will undoubtedly constitute evidence demonstrating the person's relation with the organisation; the determination, on the basis of technical data beyond any doubt, that the accused, who does not admit that he/she is a ByLock user, is found to have used the ByLock application is decisive in terms of the establishment of the imputed offence; delivering a written decision after an inadequate inquiry ... [has been found unlawful] because the detailed ByLock findings and evaluation report should have been obtained from relevant departments, the identities of persons whose names were included in the roster records in the ByLock findings and evaluation report should have been determined, the issue of whether they were accused of this offence should have been inquired, the issue of whether they gave statements in connection with the accused should have been inquired, their case file, if any, should have been summoned, and they should have been summoned and heard at a hearing as witnesses, and the comments of accused and his lawyer should have been asked in line with Article 217 of the Law no. 5271 ...”*

136. In its judgment of 10 December 2024 quashing the accused's conviction, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation made, *inter alia*, the following assessments as grounds for the quash (see Annex 58):

*“...delivering a written decision after an inadequate inquiry ... [has been found unlawful] because the ByLock findings and evaluation report with ID no. 176440, which was understood to be included in the case file, after the judgment had been rendered, in terms of determination of the organisational position and activities of the accused who stated that he was not a ByLock user, should have been read at a hearing; the issue of whether the persons, who added him, were added by him and were in the same group with him, had a connection with him should have been inquired; the issue of whether these persons had been subject to criminal investigations due to being a member of a terrorist organisation should have been inquired; if there is any, copies of their statements given in the stages should have been brought and examined; their statements should have been taken as witnesses; and then after all this evidence is taken into consideration, the legal status of the accused should have been determined...”*

137. In its judgment of 26 December 2024 quashing the accused's conviction, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation made, *inter alia*, the following assessments as grounds for the quash (see Annex 59):

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*“...Although since the ByLock communication system is a network which is designed for the use of the members of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation and is used exclusively by certain members of this terrorist organisation, the determination, on the basis of technical data which would lead to a definite conclusion without any suspicion, that the relevant person has become a part of this network in line with the organisational instruction and used it for confidential communication will undoubtedly constitute evidence demonstrating the person’s relation with the organisation; delivering a written decision after an inadequate inquiry ... [has been found unlawful] because the Bylock finding and evaluation report, which was understood to have been included in the file at the appeal stage and which stated that the accused is a ByLock user, should have been read to the accused and his lawyer at a hearing in accordance with Article 217 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and their comments should have been asked and then an assessment should have been made...”*

138. In its judgment of 27 February 2024 quashing the accused’s conviction, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation made, *inter alia*, the following assessments as grounds for the quash (see Annex 60):

*“In the event that the accused, who states that the ByLock program was installed on his/her phone but does not admit that he/she is a ByLock user, is found to have used the ByLock application with technical data beyond any doubt, the evidence that he/she is a ByLock user is decisive in terms of the establishment of the imputed offence, and the documents regarding the findings of ByLock and **the detailed ByLock findings and evaluation report should be obtained from the relevant bodies; with a view to checking the defence of the accused, who states in his/her defence that he/she is not a ByLock user, it is necessary to inquire whether there is an investigation or prosecution against the persons who appear in the ByLock findings and evaluation report as the persons who added, the accused, those whom he/she added and with whom he/she was in contact, and the statements taken during the stages in connection with the accused, if any, should be added to the file and their statements should be taken as witnesses..”***

139. In its judgment of 22 February 2024 quashing the accused’s conviction, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation made, *inter alia*, the following assessments as grounds for the quash (see Annex 61):

140. *“... the decision has been found to be unlawful on account of the fact that **a decision should have been delivered after i) reading out the ByLock findings and evaluation reports and the ByLock content transcripts to the accused and his defence counsel***

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*under Article 217 of the Law no. 5271; ii) where it was determined that they belonged to the accused, asking him whether he had any comment on them in view of the fact that the digital analysis reports -which are understood to have been added to the file at the stage of appeal on points of fact and law- regarding the digital materials seized from the accused, who stated in his defence that he was not a ByLock user, and the ByLock findings and evaluation reports -which are understood to have been added to the file at the appeal stage- indicated that the accused used the ByLock with ID nos. 144344 and 325326; iii) making an inquiry into the issue of whether there was an investigation or prosecution against the persons appearing in the ByLock findings and evaluation report as the persons who added the accused, those whom he added and with whom he was in contact, and iv) adding to the file the statements taken during the stages in connection with the accused, if any, and v) hearing those persons in the capacity of a witnesses with a view to reviewing the defence submissions of the accused.”*

141. In its judgment of 12 February 2024 quashing the accused’s conviction, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation made, *inter alia*, the following assessments as grounds for the quash (see Annex 62):

*“As indicated in the decision of the (abolished) 16<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, acting as a first-instance court, dated 24 April 2017 no. E.2015/3, K.2017/3, which was upheld and became final by the decision of the Plenary of the Court of Cassation in Criminal Matters dated 26 September 2017 no. E.2017/16-956, K.2017/970, and in the decision of the Constitutional Court dated 4 June 2020 no. 2018/15231 on the application of Ferhat Kara; the ByLock communication system is a network which is designed for the use of the members of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation and is used exclusively by certain members of this terrorist organisation and therefore, where it is found, on the basis of technical data which would lead to a definite conclusion without any suspicion, that the relevant person has become a part of this network in line with the organisational instruction and used it for confidential communication, this finding will undoubtedly constitute evidence demonstrating the person’s relation with the organisation; however, **the delivery of a decision as a result of inadequate inquiry has been found unlawful on account of the fact that a decision should have been delivered after i) making an inquiry into the issue of whether there was an investigation or prosecution against the persons appearing in the ByLock findings and evaluation report as the persons who added the accused, those whom he***

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*added and with whom he was in contact, ii) adding to the file the statements taken during the stages in connection with the accused, if any, iii) hearing those persons in the capacity of a witnesses, iv) and reading out the ByLock findings and evaluation report relating to ID no. “401571” -which is understood to have been added to the file at the appeal stage- to the accused and his defence counsel at the hearing in accordance with Article 217 of the Law no. 5271 with a view to reviewing the defence submissions of the accused, who stated in his defence that he was not a ByLock user.”*

142. In its judgment of 6 February 2024 quashing the accused’s conviction, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation made, *inter alia*, the following assessments as grounds for the quash (see Annex 63):

*“The ByLock communication system is a network which is designed for the use of the members of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation and is used exclusively by certain members of this terrorist organisation; therefore, where it is found, on the basis of technical data which would lead to a definite conclusion without any suspicion, that the relevant person has become a part of this network in line with the organisational instruction and used it for confidential communication, this finding will undoubtedly constitute evidence demonstrating the person’s relation with the organisation; however, the delivery of a decision as a result of inadequate inquiry has been found unlawful on account of the fact that a decision should have been delivered after i) making an inquiry into the issue of whether there was an investigation or prosecution against the persons appearing in the ByLock findings and evaluation report as the persons who added the accused, those whom he added and with whom he was in contact, and ii) adding to the file the statements taken during the stages in connection with the accused, if any, iii) and hearing those persons in the capacity of a witnesses with a view to reviewing the defence submissions of the accused, who stated in his defence that he was not a ByLock user.”*

143. Similarly, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation stressed the importance of the ByLock evidence in its judgment dated 5 March 2024. However, it quashed the decision on the grounds that it should have been inquired whether there was any investigation or prosecution against any of the persons who appeared in the ByLock findings and evaluation report as the persons who added the accused, those whom he added and those with whom he was in contact, and if so, they should have been heard in the capacity of a witness in terms of reviewing the defence submissions of the accused who stated that he was not a ByLock user despite there being a “ByLock findings and

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evaluation report” in the file (see Annex 64). It was pointed out that the persons the accused communicated with via ByLock, which is a secret communication tool that allows communication provided that certain passwords are shared with one another, should have been detected and their statements should have been heard.

144. The Government would like to emphasise that only some of the numerous judgments delivered consistently with the same approach by the Court of Cassation on the subject are given here. The Constitutional Court also decides on the matter in line with the Court’s case-law.

145. For example, the Constitutional Court made the following assessments in its judgment in the case of *Harun Evren*<sup>11</sup> (no. 2020/17037, 13 April 2022), in which it found a violation of the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings within the scope of the right to a fair trial (*Harun Evren*, no. 2020/17037, 13 April 2022, §§ 35-37):

*“The Constitutional Court accepts that considering the applicant’s use of an account at Bank Asya as an organisational activity is only possible if it is established that it was carried out in accordance with the instructions received from the terrorist organisation. The decisions of the Court of Cassation have also indicated that usual activities in accounts at Bank Asya cannot be considered as organisational activities. The inferior court, however, relied solely on the fact that the applicant had an account at Bank Asya and did not make any findings or assessments concerning the account activities. Therefore, it must be acknowledged that the findings regarding the applicant’s use of ByLock was the decisive -albeit not the only- evidence leading to the conviction.*

*The examination of the reasoned decision did not reveal any concrete data indicating that the inferior court conducted any inquiry regarding the CGNAT query records of the ADSL number with the IP address found to have been connected to the ByLock server IPs and used by the applicant, and the HTS records of the GSM number, if any. Although at the eighth hearing held on 27 September 2017 the applicant requested the identification and hearing of the persons indicated in the ByLock Findings and Evaluation Report, these requests were also rejected without any justification. Moreover, the statements taken during the investigations from those who had added the ID no. 141200 allegedly used by the applicant and the relevant prosecution documents, if any, were not obtained.*

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<sup>11</sup> <https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2020/17037>

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*In the present case, in view of the fact that the use of ByLock was decisive for the establishment of the offence, no inquiry was carried out into the issues raised by the applicant to the contrary of this evidence, and the requests for the collection of evidence were rejected. However, the evidence requested by the applicant could only be obtained with the assistance of a court. Accordingly, the applicant was not provided with reasonable opportunities to refute the evidence which he had no possibility of obtaining. **In conclusion, the applicant was placed in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the prosecution with regard to procedural opportunities, and the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings were violated.***

146. In its *Yunus Usluer*<sup>12</sup> decision, the Constitutional Court held that the right to a reasoned judgment had been violated as a substantive allegation that could change the outcome of the decision had not been addressed. In that decision, the Constitutional Court stated the following (*Yunus Usluer*, no. 2018/38137, 10 May 2022, §§ 41- 43):

*In the present case, the sole evidence taken as basis for convicting the applicant for the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation is the query results report indicating that he was a ByLock user. At all stages of the proceedings, the applicant objected to his alleged use of ByLock and stated that the GSM line taken as basis for ByLock findings belonged to him but he did not use the application.*

*The Court handed down the conviction on the grounds that the applicant was a part of the hierarchic structure of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation and had organic links to this organisation, based on the finding that he used this application according to the results of the ByLock report (Query Results Report) dated 26 January 2017, as the ByLock communication application was exclusively used by FETÖ/PDY members. **The ByLock Findings and Evaluation Report dated 20 June 2017 and the Data Analysis Report dated 22 February 2018, which had been issued with respect to the applicant, were added to the case file following the appellate review (see § 18). Therefore, the relevant documents were not examined by the instance court or the Regional Court of Appeal, nor did the applicant have the opportunity to be informed about these pieces of evidence against him or to submit his objections to the authenticity and credibility of these documents in line with the principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings. In the reasoned judgment of the instance court, it was not explained why the ByLock Query Results Report- which is considered***

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<sup>12</sup> <https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2018/38137>

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*insufficient on its own for the establishment of ByLock use with technical data which are beyond any doubt and lead to a definite conclusion in line with the practice of the Court of Cassation- was considered technical data/evidence capable of leading to a definite conclusion under the circumstances of the present case. In other words, the link between the contents of the report issued by law enforcement units and the act imputed to the applicant was not demonstrated clearly. Nothing regarding the assessment of these matters was stated in the decisions of the Regional Court of Appeal and the 16<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation*

*It is the trial court, as a rule, who has the power to evaluate the evidence regarding a certain case and to decide whether the evidence shown is related to the case. Moreover, both at this same stage and within this context, it is not the duty of the Constitutional Court to find a person guilty or innocent or determine a lighter or heavier punishment. The conclusion to be reached by the Constitutional Court in this context does not mean that the applicant will definitely be acquitted or convicted. It is natural that a decision will be rendered based on the result of the examination and assessment to be performed by means of the instance court eliminating the shortcomings stated here (Ruhşen Mahmutoglu, no. 2015/22, 15 January 2020, § 67). Furthermore, in the present case, it appears that the court used abstract statements in its judgment convicting the applicant of the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation and did not separately and clearly discuss the allegations regarding the applicant. **In this regard, it is not possible to accept that the Court sufficiently demonstrated with technical data in accordance with the practice of the Court of Cassation the fact of ByLock use that shows the applicant knowingly and willingly became a part of the FETÖ/PDY hierarchical structure; was continuous, diverse and intense; and was considered evidence, in view of the fact that such an acknowledgement is solely based on query results. In other words, it has been concluded that the link between the applicant and the ByLock application, which is a communications network created for the FETÖ/PDY members to use and was exclusively used by some of the members of this organisation, was not clearly established. This matter led the proceedings as a whole to be no longer fair.***

147. In view of the above, the authorities would like to note that domestic courts established a practice where the inclusion of the ByLock Findings and Evaluation Report into the case-file is ensured before the final judgment.

148. **Fifthly**, emphasising the deficiencies in the domestic courts' reasoning, the Court considered the failure of the domestic courts to support their practices with sufficient

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and pertinent reasoning, and to address the applicant's objections regarding their veracity to be one of reasons giving rise to the violation of the right to a fair trial (see *Yalçinkaya*, cited above, 337).

149. The Court noted that the domestic courts were required to make further explanation as to how it was ascertained that ByLock was not, and could not have been, used by anyone who was not a "member" of the FETÖ/PDY within the meaning of Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code (see, *ibid*, 340).

150. Detailed information on the legal value of the ByLock data as evidence and the current judicial practice in this respect has already been submitted above within the framework of the Court of Cassation's case-law under the heading of violation of Article 7. The Government would like to reiterate that Bylock is a communication application that can only be installed by following certain procedures and is only available to the FETÖ/PDY members. As can be seen within the sample judgments provided above, these facts are examined by the domestic courts in a sufficiently detailed manner. Therefore, it might be indicated that the domestic courts established a judicial practice where evidential value of the ByLock data is thoroughly explained in the courts' judgments. Furthermore, the authorities would like to note that the Court also admitted that ByLock was not just any ordinary commercial messaging application, and that its use could even *prima facie* suggest some kind of connection with the FETÖ/PDY (see, *ibid*, 259). In order to avoid repetition, the Government confines itself to referring to the previous explanations.

### **The Remaining Evidence**

151. In its assessment, the Court noted that the domestic court had not sufficiently discussed the applicant's use of an account at Bank Asya and membership of a trade union and an association. The membership of a trade union and an association is examined below under the heading of violation of Article 11.

152. The act of depositing money with Bank Asya is examined in detail in judicial practice within the framework of the criteria required by the Court of Cassation for membership of an illegal organisation and decisions are delivered on that basis. The existing case-law and practice are compatible with the Court's case-law and the Convention. The sample decisions provided below will clarify this point.



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153. For example, on 15 December 2020 the Kırşehir Assize Court decided to acquit the accused of the charge of membership of a terrorist organisation. It stated the following in its decision (see Annex 65):

*“... It has been understood that **there is no evidence or witness statements in the file to support that the accused deposited his money in the bank upon the call of the organisation’s leader; the account activities coincide with the accused’s defence and witness statements; there is no evidence in the file that the accused had a hierarchical link with the organisation; the issues mentioned within the scope of the whole file cannot be considered as organisational activities sufficient to prove that the accused is a member of an illegal organisation going beyond affiliation, and accordingly, the acts of the accused cannot be considered as evidence sufficient to prove that the accused is a member of an illegal organisation in the above-mentioned decision of the Court of Cassation; no concrete evidence has been obtained to prove beyond any doubt that the accused committed the imputed offence; these acts of the accused do not present any diversity, continuity or intensity in such a way as to indicate that the accused is part of the hierarchical structure of the armed terrorist organisation, and that the acts of the accused are not sufficient for membership of the armed terrorist organisation; as indicated in the decision of the 16<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation dated 26 October 2017 no. E.2017/1809 K.2017/5155, the acts of the accused cannot be considered as organisational activities sufficient to prove that he is a member of the organisation and that they are considered as acts not going beyond sympathy. It is therefore decided that the accused should be acquitted in line with the principle of in dubio pro reo on the ground of lack of conclusive and convincing evidence to prove beyond any doubt that the accused committed the offence charged.**”*

154. In the review of appeal on points of fact and law, the 4<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits, and upon appeal on point of law, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance court’s decision on 7 March 2024, and the decision therefore became final (see Annex 66).

155. For example, on 17 February 2021 the Ankara 13<sup>th</sup> Assize Court decided to acquit the accused of the charge of membership of a terrorist organisation. It stated the following in its decision (see Annex 67):

*“... it was understood ... that he had had an account at Bankasya before the instruction of the leader of the organisation, that considering the economic situation of the accused,*

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*his profession and the fact that he also had had accounts in other banks, the amount deposited was small compared to his economic power, that withdrawals were made in a short time after deposits, that the money was not kept in the account continuously, that the transactions were within the scope of routine banking activities, ... that his account movements had not fully complied with the instructions of the organisation leader, and that there had been no definite opinion that his account movements and the act of depositing money were carried out with the motive of fulfilling the instructions of the organisation leader.*

*[...]*

*... it was concluded that in order to accept that the accused had committed the imputed offence of being a member of an armed terrorist organisation, there must exist activities of a continuous, diverse and intense nature, and that there had been no sufficient and qualified evidence to convict the accused with a full conscientious opinion that the accused had committed actions that are suitable for the establishment of the elements of the crime.”*

156. In the review of appeal on points of fact and law, the 19<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits, and upon appeal on point of law, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance court’s decision on 31 October 2024, and the decision therefore became final (see Annex 68).

157. In another set of sample proceedings, on 7 December 2018 the Kars 2<sup>nd</sup> Assize Court convicted the accused of aiding an illegal organisation without being a member of it, in a case where depositing money with Bank Asya was also accepted as evidence. Upon appeal on points of fact and law, on 16 April 2019 the 2<sup>nd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Erzurum Regional Court of Appeal quashed the decision and acquitted the accused. In its decision, the Regional Court of Appeal noted that there was no sufficient evidence that the accused had deposited money with Bank Asya upon the instruction of the organisation’s leader. Having examined the appeal on point of law, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the acquittal by its decision of 18 March 2024 and the decision became final (see Annex 69).

158. In its decision dated 10 May 2023, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation quashed the accused’s conviction as in the sample judgments given above, in a manner consistent with the Court’s findings. In the same judgment, the Court of Cassation made,

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*inter alia*, the following assessments in relation to depositing money with Bank Asya (see Annex 70):

*“Having regard to the fact that the usual account activities carried out at Asya Katılım Bank A.Ş., which is affiliated with the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation and whose management and control and the privileges of its shareholders except for dividends were transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund by the decision of the Banking Regulation and Supervisory Authority (BDDK) dated 29 May 2015 and which continued its legal banking activities until its operating permit was revoked in accordance with the last paragraph of Article 107 of the Banking Law no. 5411 by the BDDK’s decision of 22 July 2016, cannot be considered as organisational activities or aiding the organisation, and that it is necessary to establish that opening accounts and depositing money were carried out for the benefit of the organisation in line with the instructions of the organisation’s leader/organisation;*

*The delivery of a decision as a result of inadequate inquiry has been found unlawful on account of the fact that all records showing the transactions of the accused’s accounts in other banks from the date of opening should have been obtained to be assessed together with the account in Asya Katılım Bank A.Ş. with a view to determining the criminal liability of the accused and a detailed report should have been obtained from an expert in the field of banking on the banking activities and deposit activities carried out by the accused in other banks on the same dates as well as on the closing date of the accounts and the date of termination of the deposits, and it should have been established beyond doubt whether the account activities carried out by the accused in Asya Katılım Bank A.Ş., which is affiliated with the organisation, were carried out in line with the call of the FETÖ/PDY Armed Terrorist Organisation/its leader to save the Asya Katılım Bank and in line with its aims.”*

159. In its decision dated 13 January 2025, the 3rd Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation quashed the sentence given to the accused, who was convicted for the offence of knowingly and willingly aiding and abetting an armed terrorist organisation without being a member of it by the acceptance of the account movements in Bank Asya as evidence against him. The Court of Cassation, which considered that the accused should be acquitted, stated the following in its judgment (see Annex 71):

*Although there was no definite and convincing evidence that the accused who was identified to have no connection to the hierarchical structure of the organisation, deposited money and made banking transactions in the bank affiliated with the*

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*organisation with the intention of aiding the terrorist organisation in line with the instructions of the leader of the organisation, contrary to his defences at the stages, delivering a written conviction instead of acquitting the accused of the imputed offence without taking into account the necessity that the existing doubt should be considered in favour of the accused has been found unlawful.”*

160. Similarly, in its judgment of 17 April 2024, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation quashed the conviction of the accused. The Court of Cassation made the following assessments in the relevant judgment (see Annex 72):

*“In view of the fact that the usual account activities carried out at Asya Katılım Bank A.Ş., which is affiliated with the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation and whose management and control and the privileges of its shareholders except for dividends were transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund by the decision of the BDDK dated 29 May 2015 and which continued its legal banking activities until its operating permit was revoked in accordance with the last paragraph of Article 107 of the Banking Law no. 5411 by the BDDK’s decision of 22 July 2016, cannot be considered as organisational activities or aiding the organisation in respect of the imputed offence; according to the examination of the account records in Bank Asya, the transactions in Bank Asya cannot be considered as falling outside the usual banking transactions, and it could not be established beyond any doubt that the accused acted with the intention of aiding the organisation given the fact that there is no other evidence contrary to his defence; the decision to convict him as a result of a mistake in the assessment of the evidence, instead of a decision to acquit him of the imputed offence, has been found to be unlawful.”*

161. In its judgment of 13 March 2024, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation quashed the conviction of the accused. The Court of Cassation made the following assessments in the relevant judgment (see Annex 73):

*“... Having regard to the fact that the usual account activities carried out at Asya Katılım Bank A.Ş., which is affiliated with the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation, cannot be considered as organisational activity or aiding the organisation and that payments and other transactions serving the purpose of the organisation and carried out for the benefit of the bank upon the instruction of the leader of the organisation can be considered as organisational activity in respect of the offence of membership of the organisation, and as aiding the organisation when taken alone; the accused’s acts of depositing money only a few times should have been considered as usual banking*

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*transactions, and therefore, there is no conclusive, concrete and fully convincing evidence, beyond any doubt, sufficient to convict the accused, indicating that he acted upon the instructions of the ringleader of the organisation and therefore knowingly and willingly aided the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation contrary to his defence. Accordingly, the decision to convict him instead of a decision to acquit him of the imputed offence has been found unlawful in accordance with the principle of “in dubio pro reo”.*

162. In its judgment of 20 February 2024, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation quashed the conviction of the accused. The Court of Cassation made the following assessments in the relevant judgment (see Annex 74):

163. *“Having regard to the fact that the usual account activities carried out at Asya Katılım Bank A.Ş., which is affiliated with the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation, cannot be considered as organisational activity or aiding the organisation and that payments and other transactions serving the purpose of the organisation and carried out for the benefit of the bank upon the instruction of the leader of the organisation can be considered as organisational activity in respect of the offence of membership of the organisation, and as aiding the organisation when taken alone; and in view of the fact that there is no conclusive and convincing evidence that the accused deposited money with the bank affiliated with the organisation for the purpose of supporting it upon the instruction of the organisation’s leader and with this intent, contrary to the defence submissions of the accused during the stages, in respect of whom no connection to the organisation’s hierarchical structure could be established according to the examination of the Bank Asya account records and the expert report.”*

164. In its judgment of 18 January 2024, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation quashed the conviction of the accused. The Court of Cassation made the following assessments in the relevant judgment (see Annex 75):

*“Although it appears from the examination of the Bank Asya account transactions and the expert report in the file that the accused opened a participation account and deposited money in certain periods, it has been understood that the accused stated that he had deposited the money he had allocated for the renovation of the shop he had purchased on 10 February 2014 at Bank Asya branch close to the location where he would buy the renovation materials, that he had opened a participation account with the guidance of the cashier, that he had withdrawn the money when he had needed it during the renovation process, and that he had not deposited any money after the*

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*completion of the renovation process, and that he submitted to the file the title deeds, bank receipts, rental agreements regarding the purchase and sale of shops and rental procedures. In addition, in view of the fact that there is no evidence in the file that the accused deposited money with the motive of aiding the organisation contrary to the defence of the accused and that there were no transactions in line with the other ongoing instructions, it has been found unlawful to convict the accused, instead of acquitting him of the offence charged, due to a mistake in the assessment of the evidence, in the absence of evidence to prove beyond any doubt that the accused acted with the intention of aiding the organisation.”*

165. There are many similar rulings handed by the Court of Cassation on above grounds (for more sample judgments, see Annexes 76-80.

166. The Constitutional Court also has made consistent assessments on the subject in line with the Court's judgments.

167. For example, in the case of *Cemile Doğan and Others*<sup>13</sup>, in which the Constitutional Court found a violation of the right to a reasoned decision within the scope of the right to a fair trial, the Constitutional Court made the following assessments (*Cemile Doğan and Others*, no. 2022/20577, 19 November 2024, §§ 18-19):

*“The impugned reasoned decisions referred to some account transactions taking place in 2014 and afterwards, but did not provide any explanation as to the date on which the applicant’s account at Bank Asya had been opened, the nature and volume of the banking transactions related to this account before the instruction of the leader and executives of the FETÖ/PDY to support Bank Asya, how the relevant account had been used after this instruction, and what the volume of the transactions considered as active use had been. In other words, no adequate assessment was made as to why the banking transactions in question could not be considered as usual. Therefore, it could not be demonstrated that the applicants’ banking transactions taking place after the instruction of the organisation’s leader and executives to support Bank Asya were incompatible with those taking place before this instruction or that there was an unusual account activity. Moreover, no examination was conducted by an expert specialised in the field on the account opening information of the applicants at Bank Asya, including before 2014, the monthly balance developments and all account movements since the account was first opened. In addition, according to the decisions of the Court of*

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<sup>13</sup> <https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2022/20577>

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*Cassation, it has been observed that no assessments have been made to determine whether the acts of being a member of associations and trade unions, which are accepted to be in connection with FETÖ/PDY, are considered outside the constitutional freedom of association and whether they are carried out with the intention of organisational activity or aiding the organisation, taking into account the positions and personal characteristics of the applicants. The reasoning of the conviction included abstract and general terms such as increase in the deposit account upon the instruction of the leader of the organisation, or providing liquidity to the bank through transactions which are not usual account transactions, or becoming a member of an affiliated association or trade union. **Therefore, it is understood that the applicants' allegations that they did not act in order to contribute to the realisation of the purpose of the organisation established for the purpose of committing crime and that the transactions in question were routine banking transactions and legal activities within the scope of freedom of association, which could have changed the outcome of the decision, were not addressed in the reasoning.***

*For these reasons, it should be held that there has been a violation of the right to a reasoned judgment within the scope of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 36 of the Constitution.”*

168. In the same context, in the case of *Hakan Darıcı and Others*<sup>14</sup>, in which the Constitutional Court found a violation of the right to a reasoned decision within the scope of the right to a fair trial, the Constitutional Court made the following assessments (*Hakan Darıcı and Others*, no. 2021/34045, 20 July 2023, §§ 35-37):

*“In the present case, the domestic courts had an expert examination carried out on the banking data. However, it has been found that contrary to the established practice of the Court of Cassation, the expert reports did not cover all account transactions since the opening of the account, that the reports were drawn up only on the basis of transactions in December 2013 or January 2014 and afterwards, and that the relevant reports were not sufficiently explanatory as required by the case-law of the Court of Cassation. **The reasoned decisions referred to some account transactions taking place in 2014 and afterwards, but did not provide any explanation as to the date on which the applicant’s account at Bank Asya had been opened, the nature and volume of the banking transactions related to this account before the instruction of***

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<sup>14</sup> <https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2021/34045>

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*the leader and executives of the FETÖ/PDY to support Bank Asya, how the relevant account had been used after this instruction, and what the volume of the transactions considered as active use had been. In other words, no adequate assessment was made as to why the banking transactions in question could not be considered as usual. Therefore, it could not be demonstrated that the applicants' banking transactions taking place after the instruction of the organisation's leader and executives to support Bank Asya were incompatible with those taking place before this instruction or that there was an unusual account activity. Furthermore, the decisions of the Regional Court of Appeal and the 16<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation did not contain any statement that these issues were assessed. Likewise, it has been observed that the relevant decisions do not contain any assessments demonstrating that the applicants' acts, namely their membership of associations and trade unions established to have links with the organisation, went beyond the mere sympathy and affiliation and that they acted with the intention of aiding the organisation. In conclusion, it has been understood that the applicants' allegations capable of changing the outcome of the judgment were not covered in the reasoning."*

169. Along the same lines, the Constitutional Court made the following assessment in the judgment of *Gürcan Balık*<sup>15</sup> in which it held that the right to a reasoned judgment within the scope of the right to a fair trial had been violated (see *Gürcan Balık*, no. 2020/16435, §§ 66- 72, 17 November 2022):

*"On the basis of the case-law of the Court of Cassation, the monetary transaction at the said Bank is categorically not considered as falling within the scope of the organisational activity. The judgments of the Court of Cassation acknowledged that the usual bank account activities at Bank Asya, which continued its operations on 22 July 2016 until its permission for operation was revoked and had affiliation with the FETÖ/PDY, could not be considered as falling within the scope of the organisational activity. However, the Court of Cassation considered as evidence the payments and other unusual banking transactions serving the objectives of the organisation and made for the benefit of the Bank upon the instruction of the organisation's ringleader.*

*According to the practice of the Court of Cassation, a person who made monetary transactions at Bank Asya could only be punished if it was established beyond any doubt*

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<sup>15</sup> <https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2020/16435>



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*that he/she had acted upon the instruction of the organisation's ringleader. The assessment in this regard is made by following these steps: the records of the accused person's account opening information including before 2014, monthly balance information and all account activities in Bank Asya are added to the case-file and examined; an expert report on the available records is obtained; and it is established whether the accused person opened participation accounts and purchased foreign currency or gold, deposited money, etc. after and in line with the instruction of the organisation leader.*

***In the present case, the court has not established a link between the transactions giving rise to the criminal charges and the call made by the organisation's leader on 25 December 2013 to deposit money in Bank Asya...***

*In order for the account activities in Bank Asya, which were relied on to sentence the applicant for the offence of membership of the organisation, to be considered as evidence, according to the criteria determined by the Court of Cassation, it should be established beyond any doubt that the person made the payments and other -unusual - banking transactions serving the objectives of the organisation and made for the benefit of the Bank upon the instruction of the organisation's ringleader. **Because, according to the well-established case-law, in order for the account activities in Bank Asya to be considered within the scope of organisational activity, it must be established by an expert report that an increase in the deposit account was made upon the instruction or that liquidity was provided to the Bank with a transaction other than the usual account activities.***

*In the present case, the court held that the applicant had acted in accordance with the call of the organisation's leader on the grounds that on 10 January 2014 and 14 January 2014 the applicant had deposited money in Bank Asya and kept it in his bank account during the period where the call in question had been made; that despite all the warnings announced via the national press, he had not withdrawn his deposit from the Bank; and that he had continued to keep his deposit in his Bank Asya account to provide support to the organisation. The court consequently convicted the applicant. **According to the court, the money in question had been deposited before the instruction of the organisation's leader. Drawing attention to the relevant judgments of the Court of Cassation, the applicant, at all stages of the proceedings, argued that keeping the money during the period when the call had been made could not be accepted as evidence for the offence of being a member of a terrorist organisation. The court***

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*made no assessment on the applicant's defence submission in question. Moreover, no inquiry was conducted as to the accuracy of the applicant's defence submissions to the effect that the expert report on his account activities in Bank Asya was erroneous, that the deposit in question was transferred to other banks and that there existed documents showing these transactions, nor were the conclusions reached in this respect discussed in the reasoned judgment.*

*For these reasons, it should be held that there has been a violation of the right to a reasoned judgment within the scope of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 36 of the Constitution."*

170. For other sample judgments of the Constitutional Court in the same vein, the judgments of *Bekir Savcı and Others*<sup>16</sup> (no. 2021/24370, 20 June 2023) and *Nagehan Özgül* may be examined. As is seen, there exists well-established and consistent case-law of both the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court in respect of the subject. These judgments show that the practice in the domestic law as to depositing money in Bank Asya is in line with the Court's case-law and the Convention standards.

#### **D. Conclusion regarding Violation of Article 6**

171. As explained in detail above, the underlying reasons for the violation at hand stemmed from the judicial practice of the domestic courts dealing with the present case. The Government would like to note that, as demonstrated by numerous recent sample judgments, the current judicial practice fully aligns with the Convention standards. The authorities therefore consider that no further general measure is necessary.

#### **E. Violation of Article 11 of the Convention**

172. The applicant submitted that the judicial bodies' decision to convict him of a terrorism offence and to sentence him, on the grounds, *inter alia*, of his membership of a trade union and an association had constituted an interference with his rights guaranteed under Article 11 of the Convention.

173. The Court's assessment regarding the subject reads as follows (see *Yalçınkaya*, cited above, §§ 390 - 396):

*"It is common ground that the trade union and the association in question were established and were operating lawfully prior to their dissolution by Legislative Decree no. 667 after the attempted coup d'état on the ground that they posed a national security threat on account of their affiliation with the FETÖ/PDY. The Court considers that acts*

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<sup>16</sup> <https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2021/24370>

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*which appear on their face to come within the scope of Article 11 of the Convention and which do not incite violence or otherwise reject the foundations of a democratic society should benefit from a presumption of legality. That being said, it is open to the domestic authorities to rebut this presumption in a given case. It should thus be ascertained whether the domestic authorities did so in the present case.*

*In that regard, the Court notes that there is no explanation in the trial court's judgment in respect of the nature of the actions of the trade union and the association in question which brought about their dissolution by Legislative Decree no. 667. The trial court's assessment on that point was limited to observing that they had been shut down pursuant to the said Legislative Decree on account of their affiliation with the FETÖ/PDY."*

174. The Court, consequently, considered that the issue giving rise to the violation of Article 11 of the Convention concerned the domestic courts' failure to provide sufficient reasoning as to how the applicant's involvement in those structures affected the materialisation of the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation.

175. As a piece of information on the current practice, it may be noted that membership of an association or trade union is not accepted as sufficient evidence *per se* for the offence of being a member of the FETÖ/PDY terrorist organisation. In assessing the evidence regarding membership of an association or trade union, the judicial authorities reach a conclusion by making a detailed examination as to whether this evidence shows that the accused person's relation with the organisation is within the hierarchical structure of the organisation beyond the level of sympathy towards it and whether the accused's acts involve diversity, continuity and intensity as required for the constitution of the offence in question. The recent sample judgments demonstrate that the practice has become settled in the domestic law.

176. In its judgment of 18 November 2019, the Isparta 2<sup>nd</sup> Assize Court acquitted the accused person who had an account in Bank Asya and was a member of an association that was dissolved pursuant to the Decree-Law for having connection and affiliation with the armed terrorist organisation. The Assize Court referred to the Court of Cassation's consideration that membership of an association was not a criterion in itself for the constitution of the offence of being a member to a terrorist organisation; it also found that there was no evidence showing that the accused person had deposited money in Bank Asya upon the organisation's instruction and decided to acquit her. Following the appeal on points of facts and law, on 18 February 2021 the 2<sup>nd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Antalya Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the request for appeal on the merits.

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Subsequently, another request for the appeal on points of law was filed and on 31 October 2024 the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment.

The acquittal therefore became final (see Annex 81).

177. On 13 June 2019, the Tekirdağ 2nd Assize Court acquitted the accused, who had account transactions in Bank Asya and was also a member of an association affiliated with the organisation. The judgment noted as follows:

*“Although the criminal proceedings were initiated against the accused for the offence of knowingly and intentionally aiding and abetting an armed terrorist organisation without being part of the hierarchical structure of that organisation; as stated in the aforementioned decision of the 16th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in order for this offence to be constituted, there must exist an organic link with the organisation and as a rule, there must exist acts and activities of a continuous, diverse and intense character. However, the perpetrators of the offences that can only be committed by the members of the organisation must also be considered as members of that organisation, even if these offences do not have the characteristics of continuity, diversity and intensity in terms of their nature, the way they are committed, the severity of the harm and danger that occurs and their contribution to the aims and interests of the organisation. In the concrete case, it is concluded that the fact that the accused's Bank Asya account transactions are within the scope of routine banking activities and his membership record in the association affiliated with the organisation will not be sufficient to prove the crime attributed to him. Since no concrete evidence sufficient to punish the accused for committing the offence attributed to him could be obtained, the accused was acquitted in accordance with Article 223/2-e of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”*

178. Following the appeal on points of facts and law, on 24 September 2020 the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the İstanbul Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the request for appeal on the merits. Subsequently, another request for the appeal on points of law was filed and on 7 October 2024 the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment. The acquittal therefore became final (see Annex 82).

179. In its judgment of 11 November 2021, the Eskişehir 2<sup>nd</sup> Assize Court acquitted the accused person who had an account in Bank Asya and was a member of an association that was dissolved pursuant to the Decree-Law for having connection and affiliation with the armed terrorist organisation. The Assize Court referred to the Court of Cassation's consideration that membership of an association was not a criterion in itself

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for the constitution of the offence of being a member to a terrorist organisation; it also found that there was no evidence showing that the accused person had deposited money in Bank Asya upon the organisation's instruction and decided to acquit him. Following the appeal on points of facts and law, on 19 January 2023 the 4<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the request for appeal on the merits. Subsequently, another request for the appeal on points of law was filed and on 24 January 2024 the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment. The acquittal therefore became final (see Annex 83).

180. In its judgment of 22 October 2019, the Konya 6<sup>th</sup> Assize Court acquitted the accused person who was a member of an association that was dissolved pursuant to the Decree-Law for having connection and affiliation with the armed terrorist organisation. The Assize Court stated that there existed no evidence showing that the accused person had conducted the organisational activities other than the membership of the said association and thus, the mere membership of that association could not be considered as a criminal element. Following the appeal on points of facts and law, on 31 January 2020 the 2<sup>nd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Konya Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the request for appeal on the merits. Subsequently, another request for the appeal on points of law was filed and on 15 January 2024 the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment. The acquittal therefore became final (see Annex 84).

181. In its acquittal judgment dated 21 June 2019, the Denizli 5<sup>th</sup> Assize Court made the following assessments (see Annex 85):

*“... it has been seen that [the accused person] was a member of the association and trade union belonging to the organisation. However; having regard to the judgment of the 16<sup>th</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation (E. 2017/3695, K. 2018/729) concerning being a member of the association and being a provincial representative of the trade union belonging to the organisation, no concrete, conclusive and convincing evidence beyond any doubt has been obtained, showing that the accused person established an organic link with the organisation despite having known the ultimate purpose of the organisation, that he submitted his will to the disposal of the organisation's hierarchical power, that he carried out acts of diverse, continuous and intense nature on behalf of the organisation and that he was a member of the organisation. Consequently, it has been decided to acquit the accused person.”*

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182. In its judgment dated 12 December 2023, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the ruling of the first instance court and it thus became final (see Annex 86).

183. In its judgment dated 2 October 2017, the Kars 2<sup>nd</sup> Assize Court sentenced the accused person, who was a member of the association and trade union shut down under the Decree-Law along with the other pieces of evidence, for the offence of aiding and abetting the organisation without being a member of it. In the appellate review, on 8 October 2019 the 2<sup>nd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Erzurum Regional Court of Appeal set aside the judgment convicting the accused person and acquitted him. The following assessment was included in the judgment (see Annex 87):

*“The first instance court convicted the accused person for the offence of knowingly and willingly aiding and abetting an armed terrorist organisation on the grounds that the SGK (Social Security Institution) records showed that he had worked for the workplaces belonging to the organisation between 2010- 2016, that he had opened an account in Bank Asya on 29 January 2014 and that he was a member of the association and trade union belonging to the organisation. According to the entire case file, the sufficient and convincing evidence requiring his conviction could not be obtained concerning the fact that the accused person carried out continuous, various, and intense acts and activities in line with the purposes of the organisation in such a manner as to demonstrate that he embraced the founding purposes, acts and activities of the organisation. For this reason, it has been decided to acquit the accused person under Article 223 § 2 (e) of the CCP as it has not been established that he committed the imputed offence...”*

184. On 23 March 2023, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the ruling of Regional Court of Appeal and it thus became final (see Annex 88).

185. These principles set forth by the Court of Cassation are applied by the first instance courts. Otherwise, the Court of Cassation quashes these judgments and remits the case file to the first instance courts. Relevant samples on the subject are given below:

186. In its judgment quashing the accused persons’ conviction on 26 June 2024, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation noted the following (see Annex 89):

*“... Although it was understood that the statements of the witnesses taken as basis for the judgment that the accuseds, against whom that there was no evidence that they knew the ultimate aim of the organisation and they established an organic bond with the organisation and joined its hierarchy, attended the chats, were made before the operational activities of the organisation; that after the examination of the account*

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*transactions in Bank Asya, which is accepted as the financial source of the organisation as suggested by the evidence accepted by the court and included in the case file, it is considered that the deposits made by the accuseds to their accounts and the opening of participation accounts were not carried out with the instruction of the leader of the organisation and they were routine transactions; and that considering the position and personal characteristics of the accuseds, their memberships of associations and trade unions cannot be considered within the scope of activities that exceed the level of sympathy and association and show that they acted with the intention to help the organisation, instead of acquitting the accuseds, against whom there is no evidence beyond any doubt requiring their conviction for the crime of aiding the organisation, delivering a written decision to convict them as a result of the mistake in the evaluation of the evidence required quashing of that decision.”*

187. Likewise, in its judgment quashing the accused person’s conviction on 31 October 2024, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation noted the following (see Annex 90):

*“...it has not been found that he used a code name indicating his link with the organisation as of the date of the offence. As seen in his unrebutted defence submissions as from the very beginning of the investigation, there is no other evidence in respect of the accused than his membership of the association, attending conversation meetings with unclear content and Bank Asya account transactions. For this reason, it has been understood that his activities remained at the level of sympathy on the ground that his acts within the scope of the case-file were not of continuous, varied and intense nature indicating that he involved in the hierarchical structure of the organisation and had an organic link with the organisation. Furthermore, according to the records in respect of the accused person’s bank account, no sufficient and strong evidence beyond any doubt for his conviction could be obtained as to his having deposited money and opened a participation account in Bank Asya, the terrorist organisation-affiliated financial establishment, for organisational purposes and to procure benefits for the organisation in accordance with the instruction of the organisation’s leader. Accordingly, instead of acquitting the accused, delivering a written decision to convict him has been found unlawful.”*

188. In the same vein, in its judgment quashing the accused person’s conviction on 25 November 2024, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation noted the following (see Annex 91):

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*“...As seen in his unrebutted defence submissions as from the very beginning of the investigation, there is no other evidence in respect of the accused than his membership of the association and attending conversation meetings with unclear content. For this reason, it has been understood that his activities remained at the level of sympathy on the ground that his acts within the scope of the case-file were not of continuous, varied and intense nature indicating that he involved in the hierarchical structure of the organisation and had an organic link with the organisation. Accordingly, instead of acquitting the accused, delivering a written decision to convict him has been found unlawful.”*

189. In its judgment quashing the accused person’s conviction on 24 October 2024, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation noted the following (see Annex 92):

*“...it has not been found that he used a code name indicating his link with the organisation as of the date of the offence. As seen in his unrebutted defence submissions as from the very beginning of the investigation, there is no other evidence in respect of the accused than his membership of the association and attending conversation meetings with unclear content. For this reason, it has been understood that his activities remained at the level of sympathy on the ground that his acts within the scope of the case-file were not of continuous, varied and intense nature indicating that he involved in the hierarchical structure of the organisation and had an organic link with the organisation. Accordingly, instead of acquitting the accused, delivering a written decision to convict him has been found unlawful.”*

190. In its judgment quashing the accused person’s conviction on 11 December 2023, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation noted the following (see Annex 93):

*“According to the results of the inquiry made on the accused person’s account activities in Bank Asya, which is considered as the source of finance for the organisation, it is seen that he opened a participation account on 17 November 2014 and withdrew his deposit and closed the account on 20 April 2015; that he continued to use his account subsequent to the transfer of Bank Asya to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (“TMSF”) and carried out transactions. Having regard to these findings, he did not deposit money [in the said Bank] in accordance with the instructions of the organisation’s leader, but the relevant transactions have been considered as usual ones. **The accused person’s membership of associations could not be regarded as an activity beyond sympathy and affiliation indicating that he had acted with the intent to aid the organisation. It could not be established that he had conducted any significant***



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*organisational acts or actions after the operational activities, known by the public, carried out by the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation. There is no evidence beyond any doubt as to the applicant's having established an organic link with the organisation and becoming involved in its hierarchical structure despite knowing the ultimate goal of the organisation. The judgment convicting the accused person was rendered without taking into account the fact that his actions remained at the level of sympathy and as a result of the erroneous assessment of the evidence. [In the circumstances], the judgment convicting him, although the accused person should have been acquitted, has been found to be unlawful."*

191. In its judgment quashing the accused person's conviction on 27 November 2023, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation noted the following (see Annex 94):

*"... According to the witness statements, the accused person was a partner of a company belonging to the organisation and a member of the association shut down via the Decree-Law; he conducted activities as a trustee within the tradesmen's quarter (esnafıar bölgesi) before 2013 and gave financial support; and he participated in conversation meetings (sohbet). It could not be established that he carried out any organisational acts or activities after the period when the organisation's operational activities became publicly known. The accused person's relation with the organisation is not of continuous, varied and intense nature indicating that he was involved in the hierarchical structure of the organisation beyond the level of sympathy towards it. In addition, there is no decisive and sufficient evidence beyond any doubt as to the accused person has committed the offence of being a member of a terrorist organisation or the offence of aiding and abetting [a terrorist] organisation. [In the circumstances], the judgment convicting him, although the accused person should have been acquitted, has been found to be unlawful."*

192. In its judgment quashing the accused person's conviction on 28 December 2023, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation noted the following (see Annex 95):

*"... It has been understood that the accused person has relations with the layers [of the organisation's structure pyramid] utilised as the so-called legitimacy window of the organisation. However, there is no sufficient evidence indicating that he was aware of the organisation's ultimate aim. Having regard to the facts, the allegations in the indictment, the court's acceptance, the accused persons' acts involved in the case-file and the witnesses' statements; it has not been found that he used a code name indicating his link with the organisation as of the date of the offence; and that he was*

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*a part of the communication network of the organisation. As seen in his un rebutted defence submissions in the very beginning of the investigation, there is not any other evidence in respect of the accused person than his membership of the association and media outlets and his being a shareholder of the Bank Asya A Group. For this reason, it has been understood that his activities remained at the level of sympathy on the ground that his acts within the scope of the case-file were not of continuous, varied and intense nature indicating that he was involved in the hierarchical structure of the organisation and had an organic link therewith. Furthermore, according to the records in respect of the accused person's bank account, no sufficient and strong evidence beyond any doubt for his conviction could be obtained as to his having deposited money and opened a participation account in Bank Asya, the terrorist organisation-affiliated financial establishment, for organisational purposes and to procure benefits for the organisation in accordance with the instruction of the organisation's leader. [In the circumstances], the judgment convicting him, although the accused person should have been acquitted, has been found to be unlawful."*

193. In its judgment quashing the accused person's conviction on 27 April 2024, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation noted the following (see Annex 96):

*"According to the account activities in Bank Asya and the reports issued by the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) and the experts, on 16 December 2002 the accused person opened an account in the Bank for the first time. Despite the fact that the accused person opened participation accounts on 8 January 2014 and 4 February 2015 in parallel with the dates when the instructions in question were given, it has been understood that as of the period before 2014, he opened a participation account and continued to use it after the transfer of Bank Asya to the TMSF. The accused person's account activities were not carried out upon the instruction of the organisation's leader, but as a result of routine banking transactions, and his actions regarding membership of associations and trade unions could not be considered as falling within the scope of activities that exceed the level of sympathy and affiliation and prove that he acted with the intention to aid the organisation. Having regard to these facts, there is no evidence beyond any doubt as to his having acted in order to aid the organisation. [In the circumstances], the judgment convicting him as a result of the erroneous assessment of the evidence, although the accused person should have been acquitted, has been found to be unlawful."*

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194. In its judgment quashing the accused person's conviction on 03 May 2023, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation noted the following (see Annex 97):

*"It has been found that the usual bank account activities at Asya Katılım Bankası A.Ş., the management and supervision of which were transferred to the TMSF with their partnership rights excluding dividends via the decision of the BDDK dated 29 May 2015 and which continued its operations until its permission for operation was revoked via the decision dated 22 July 2016 under the last paragraph of Article 107 of the Law no. 5411 and had affiliation with the FETÖ/PDY, could not be considered as falling within the scope of the organisational activity.*

*According to the account activities in Bank Asya and the expert reports included in the case-file, on 31 January 2014 the accused person opened an account in the said Bank for the first time. He continued to keep his gold account in the Bank until 7 March 2016, and considering that the money in his account was withdrawn on 7 March 2016, it has been understood that the accused person did not withdraw his money from the said bank after the transfer of Bank Asya to the TMSF and kept it in his account. The account activities in question were not carried out with the instruction of the organisation's leader, but as a result of routine banking transactions, and the accused person's acts **regarding the membership of associations and trade unions could not be considered as falling within the scope of activities that exceed the level of sympathy and affiliation and prove that he acted with the intention to aid the organisation.** Having regard to these facts, there is no evidence beyond any doubt as to his having acted in order to aid the organisation. [In the circumstances], the judgment convicting him as a result of the erroneous assessment of the evidence, although the accused person should have been acquitted, has been found to be unlawful."*

195. There are many similar rulings handed by domestic courts on above grounds (for more sample decisions, see Annexes 98-100).

196. The Constitutional Court's assessments on the subject are also in line with the Court's judgments. For example in its *Hasan Sarıcı*<sup>17</sup> judgment, the Constitutional Court made the following assessments regarding the membership of an association or trade union (*Hasan Sarıcı*, no. 2018/37695, 9 October 2024, §§ 38, 39 and 50):

*Another evidence taken into consideration by the first instance court in the conviction of the applicant for being a member of a terrorist organisation was the fact that the*

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<sup>17</sup> <https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/BB/2018/37695>

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*applicant was a member of associations and trade unions affiliated with FETÖ/PDY. The Court of Cassation has evaluated the evidence of membership to legally established trade unions or associations in many of its judgments regarding convictions for being a member of the FETÖ/PDY. According to this assessment, establishing, being a member of, or taking part in the management and supervisory boards of trade unions, associations and other legal organisations affiliated with the FETÖ/PDY in itself is not sufficient to conclude that individuals know the ultimate goal of the organisation, have established an organic connection with the organisation beyond the level of affiliation, and are included in the hierarchy of the organisation. According to the Court of Cassation, being a member of an association identified to be affiliated with the FETÖ/PDY can only be taken as basis for a conviction if it is established that the individual has become a part of the terrorist organisation's hierarchical structure and engaged in activities involving continuity, diversity, and intensity (Bilal Celalettin Şaşmaz, §§ 17, 18, 57).*

*“The Court of Cassation's decision to consider being a member of trade unions or associations affiliated with a terrorist organisation as evidence for punishing a person for being a member of a terrorist organisation with the condition that there must exist organisational activities carried out within the hierarchy of a terrorist organisation pointed out the importance of the right to form and to join trade unions and freedom of association in a democratic society (on the importance and scope of the right to form and to join trade unions and freedom of association, see Hint Aseel Hayvanları Koruma ve Geliştirme Derneği and Hikmet Neğüç, No: 2014/4711, 22/2/2017, §§ 41-44; on the concept of trade union freedom and the scope of the right to form and to join trade unions, see Yasemin Ekşi, No: 2013/5486, 4/12/2013, § 68; Bilal Celalettin Şaşmaz, § 58). In the case at hand, the fact that the applicant was a member of an association and a trade union was used as evidence in his sentencing. However, individuals are free to form or join a trade union as they wish. Article 51 of the Constitution stipulates that employees have the right to freely join and withdraw from trade unions and that no one may be forced to join or withdraw from a trade union (Abbas Akçay and others, No: 2015/2790, 23/5/2018, § 30; Bilal Celalettin Şaşmaz, § 58). Indeed, the right to engage in trade union activities, which constitutes one of the elements of the right to form and to join trade unions, is only possible by securing individual trade union membership (Hüseyin Ercan, No: 2018/11352, 8/9/2021, § 33; Bilal Celalettin Şaşmaz, § 58).*

*[...]*

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*In the concrete case, the court of first instance -when the facts concerning the applicant's membership of AKTİF EĞİTİM-SEN, which is affiliated with the organisation, his registration in an association, the statement of witness R.D. that he was close to the community until 2009 and that he was in the community and participated in conversations, the statement of accused H.H.K., his Bank Asya account movements and his subscription to the Zaman newspaper are taken as a whole- failed to establish that the applicant acted with the intention of being a member of a terrorist organisation under the circumstances of the concrete case.”*

197. As can be understood from the sample decisions, it can be considered that a Convention compliant judicial practice, which is supported by consistent and established case-law, has been adopted in Turkish Law. The existing practice is in line with the Court's judgment and the Convention standards. The authorities therefore consider that there are no other general measures to be taken.

#### **F. Training and Awareness-Raising Activities**

198. The Justice Academy, the only competent institution as to pre-service and in-service trainings for judges and prosecutors, was established in 2003 and has a public legal personality and scientific, administrative and financial autonomy. Since its establishment, the Academy has been providing in-service and pre-service training on a high number of topics including, *inter alia*, the right to a fair trial.

199. The Turkish authorities would like to emphasise that the issues on human rights, and in particular the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, have been incorporated into the training of judges and prosecutors, and that such trainings are diligently provided.

200. Within the scope of the pre-service trainings at the Justice Academy, 5,988 candidate judges and prosecutors have been trained in the fields of “Human Rights and Their Protection” and “Constitutional Jurisdiction and Individual Application” from 2021 until the end of 2025. In addition, in the same period, 2,500 candidate judges and prosecutors have been provided training on “Reasoning of Judgments in Criminal Proceedings”.

201. 1,410 judges and prosecutors have received training, on the subject of, *inter alia*, the right to a fair trial and the right to a reasoned judgment, through distance learning system, either online or offline.

202. Within the framework of the Project on Strengthening the Criminal Justice System and the Capacity of Justice Professionals on Prevention of the European Convention on

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Human Rights Violations (CASII), the Ministry of Justice organised 13 coordination meetings on procedural safeguards and the prevention of potential ECHR violations in criminal investigations and prosecutions related to terrorism, the financing of terrorism, and cybercrimes. These meetings were attended by a total of 411 participants including judges, public prosecutors, law enforcement officers (including representatives from the General Police Department, Provincial Police Departments, Provincial Gendarmerie Commands, and Customs Directorate), financial crime investigation experts, experts from the Information and Communication Technologies Authority, as well as representatives from the Ministry of Justice, the Union of Turkish Bar Associations, and the Turkish Criminal Law Association as a non-governmental organisation. Additionally, 9 round table meetings on the same topics were attended by a total of 879 participants, including judges and public prosecutors, law enforcement personnel, financial crime investigation experts, and representatives from the Ministry of Justice and the Justice Academy of Türkiye. Furthermore, 300 judicial employees participated in four series of international workshops. 10 Turkish judicial employees were assigned to serve and gain experience at the Registry of the ECtHR or various departments of the Council of Europe for a period of two to three months.

203. Guide on Admissibility of Evidence in Criminal Matters (15,564 copies), Guide on Fight against the Financing of Terrorism (17,519 copies), Guide on Investigations into Cyber Crimes (17,574 copies), Guide on Seizure of Cryptocurrencies (3,000 copies) and Guide on Digital Evidence (3,000 copies), which contain examples of good practices within the context of the case-law of the Court, were prepared and disseminated to particularly 149 Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, high judicial institutions, the Union of Turkish Bar Associations, the project stakeholders and all the relevant institutions in order to be made available for the use of practitioners.

204. A brochure regarding the general principles of the right to a fair trial (Article 6 § 1 of the Convention), the minimum guarantees provided to suspects and accused persons (Article 6 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention), and the rights of persons under custody was printed in 75,000 copies for the purpose of informing the public about the rights protected under the Convention and the Court's case-law and about criminal justice. The brochure in question was disseminated to the public through assize courts (67,950 copies), local bar associations (5,850 copies), the Ministry of Justice and via the open court days organised within the scope of the project.

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205. Serving judges and prosecutors have been provided with in-service trainings prepared by the Justice Academy of Türkiye on the Writing of Reasoned Judgments in Criminal Law, the Right to Liberty and Security, the Fight against the Financing of Terrorism and the Fight against Cyber Crimes; and a total of 2016 judges and prosecutors attended the trainings in question.”
206. Within the scope of the Project on Supporting Effective Execution of Constitutional Court's Judgments in the Field of Fundamental Rights, 663 judges and prosecutors have received Fundamental Human Rights Training in 2024.
207. Under the auspices of the Justice Academy, an online seminar on “Comparative Perspectives on the Reasoning of Judgments” was held in 2021 with the participation of 174 persons, including the members of the Turkish judiciary, within the scope of the Work on Reasoning of Judicial Judgments.
208. The authorities, consequently, would like to emphasise that judges and prosecutors in Türkiye are provided with continuous training on human rights and the Court's case-law, that their competence in this area is developed through planned training programmes and that necessary measures are taken to prevent possible violations.

#### **G. The European Court’s findings under Article 46**

209. The European Court made its assessments on the basis of the facts occurred within the context of the present case.
210. As a matter of fact, the Committee should consider the current judicial practice, which was thoroughly explained above on the basis of sample judgments, for the purpose of supervision of execution of the judgment at hand. There is a consistent, well-established and Convention compliant case-law concerning the issues examined under *Yalçınkaya* case.
211. Moreover, the domestic law has effective judicial remedies. Where a final judgment convicting a person is not in line with the framework set out in the judgments of the ECtHR and the Constitutional Court, the persons concerned may lodge an individual application with the Constitutional Court in respect of this judgment. As explained in detail above, the Constitutional Court has adopted a judicial practice in compliance with the Court’s case-law. Where the Constitutional Court finds a violation, it remits the case-file to the relevant instance court for reopening of the proceedings in order to eliminate the reasons of violation. On this ground, given the principle of subsidiarity, the Committee should take into account that domestic mechanisms are capable of providing effective remedies when necessary in similar cases.

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#### **H. Translation and Dissemination of Judgment**

212. The hereby judgment was translated into Turkish and published on the official website of the Court (<https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-229312>).
213. The Turkish authorities further ensured that the translation of the judgment, together with an explanatory note, has been disseminated to the relevant first instance courts, the Court of Cassation, the Constitutional Court, the Human Rights and Equality Institution of Türkiye and the Ombudsman Institution.

#### **IV. CONCLUSION**

214. The Committee of Ministers will be duly informed of the individual and general measures within the scope of the present case.